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WHEN DOES RESTITUTION BECOME 
RETRIBUTION? 
MELANIE REID* & CURTIS L. COLLIER** 
I. Introduction 
During a civil trial, a defendant is typically focused on one thing:  “How 
much money will this trial cost me if I lose?”  The focus is quite different 
for a criminal defendant:  “How much time will I serve in prison if I am 
found guilty?”  Defense teams in both criminal and civil proceedings have 
similar objectives, i.e., minimize any damages imposed against their clients.  
However, in the scheme of things, financial loss is usually preferable to 
prison or loss of liberty.  For that reason, most people lose sight of the fact 
that oftentimes a criminal defendant may face not only serious jail time but 
also debilitating financial losses in the form of restitution to identified 
victims.  Restitution should be awarded to victims to compensate them for 
their losses, but excess restitution is tantamount to unfair retribution.  
Excess restitution has become particularly troubling in child pornography 
cases when one victim’s image is illegally possessed or distributed by 
multiple convicted criminal defendants.  The result of duplicative restitution 
is often unjust enrichment of victims, who are sometimes compensated 
millions of dollars for one illicit image. This raises serious questions 
regarding when and how justice is served through the restitution process 
during criminal proceedings. 
At the end of a federal criminal trial, if the defendant is convicted, the court 
sentences the defendant to a term of imprisonment, imposes a standard term of 
supervised release, and issues a $100 assessment/criminal monetary fine per 
each count of conviction to be paid to the court.1  Yet, there is an unfamiliar 
issue that increasingly arises at sentencing that touches upon the same 
concerns as those facing a civil defendant:  restitution. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law.  I 
would like to thank Robert Reid, Pat Laflin, Professor Bruce Beverly, and Associate Dean 
April Meldrum for their thoughts and criticism on this Article, and Heather Shubert for her 
research assistance.  I would also like to thank Judge Collier in bringing this issue to the 
forefront and inspiring me to delve further into this specific area of criminal law. 
 ** Chief United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee.  I 
would like to thank my law clerk Adam Sanders for his thoughts and comments on this issue 
and his invaluable research assistance. 
 1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32. 
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Criminal restitution, like civil liability, threatens a criminal defendant with 
substantial financial loss.  Despite the possibility of a large and at times unfair 
restitution award, criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors rarely devote 
adequate time to consideration of a third party’s request for restitution.  This is 
partially because, despite a growing body of statutory and case law addressing 
restitution,2 criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors are not as familiar with 
restitution determinations as are their civil counterparts.  Additionally, 
criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors focus on what they perceive to be 
more immediate concerns such as guilt and innocence and the length of 
sentence.  Criminal prosecutors and defense attorneys are usually unfamiliar 
with restitution determinations which apply more to civil remedies.  
Restitution may be mentioned at the conclusion of a criminal trial, but this 
issue is secondary to incarceration deliberations.  Restitution is thus never at 
the forefront of criminal proceedings. 
What is restitution’s place in the criminal proceeding?  English courts 
first developed restitution centuries ago as a contractual remedy to prevent 
unjust enrichment of one party over another.3  The United States brought 
the concept of restitution to the court system and expanded its use to 
contracts, torts, and criminal law.4  In criminal law, restitution is an 
affirmative performance by the defendant that benefits the individual victim 
affected by the crime.5  Restitution has many definitions.  The one most 
applicable to its use in a criminal proceeding is: 
Return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner 
or status . . . [c]ompensation for loss; esp[ecially], full or partial 
compensation paid by a criminal to a victim, not awarded in a 
civil trial for tort, but ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as 
a condition of probation.”6   
In criminal proceedings, the sentence is meant to punish, deter, 
incapacitate, and hopefully in some cases, rehabilitate the guilty.7  
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5(a), 18 
U.S.C. § 3663 (2006); Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 
204 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §3663A (2006)). 
 3. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW 314, 888 (2009).  
 4. Id. at 853-54. 
 5. United States v. Wyzynski, 581 F. Supp. 1550 (E.D. Pa. 1984); FRANK W. MILLER, 
ROBERT O. DAWSON, GEORGE E. DIX & RAYMOND R. PARNAS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1222 (Foundation Press, 5th ed. 2000). 
 6. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (9th ed. 2009). 
 7. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). 
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Restitution, however, introduces another important consideration to the 
case.  It is the only element of the sentence that focuses solely on the victim 
and, as the definition states, is meant to restore the victim to his or her 
original state before the crime occurred.  As an example, imagine a 
defendant who has been convicted of robbing a bank.  The punitive aspects 
of his sentence may include a term of imprisonment, supervised release, 
and a fine.  In order to make the victim of the crime whole, however, the 
court may order the defendant to reimburse the bank for the whole amount 
of money he originally stole.  But if the purpose of restitution is to make the 
victim of a crime “whole,” then it is not meant as additional punishment to 
the defendant, but rather something akin to punitive damages in the civil 
tort law context.8 
A judge must decide the restitution amount to be awarded to the victim in a 
criminal case.  To accomplish this, a judge must consider whether the restitution 
should focus on the gains the defendant has received from the crime or focus on 
the victim’s losses as a result of the crime.9  The criminal court system can learn 
from the civil court system’s time-tested approach to damages, compensation, 
and restitution.  The civil system employs the use of nominal, compensatory, 
and punitive damages, general and specific damages, non-pecuniary and 
pecuniary losses, and concepts such as joint and several liability and equitable 
remedies to return victims to their state of being “whole.”10 
Not every request for restitution is as simple as repaying the bank or 
returning the stolen car to the original owner.  Some crimes lend themselves 
to a more complicated restitution decision from the judge, as this article 
will show.  The VWPA required that restitution be ordered as a separate 
component of every sentence if requested.11  The MVRA amended the 
codified statutes involving restitution, specifically 18 U.S.C §§ 3663 and 
3664, adding that victims must be “directly and proximately” harmed by the 
offense and that each victim is entitled to the “full amount of each victim’s 
losses.”12  However, it was the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 
passed in 1994, that guaranteed restitution for certain title 18 offenses, such 
                                                                                                                 
 8. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1063 (2000). 
 9. In other words, should the victim receive the value of whatever was conferred to the 
defendant as a result of the crime or should the victim’s compensation come from the loss 
the victim has suffered as a result of the defendant’s unlawful act? 
 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 32.  Civil damages are typically determined by a jury whereas 
criminal restitution awards are determined by the judge. 
 11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664. 
 12. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2006)). 
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as violence against women, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children, 
domestic violence and telemarketing fraud.13  This article specifically 
explores federal court orders of restitution entered against defendants 
convicted of possessing child pornography—intended to help make victims 
of sexual abuse and exploitation whole.14 
Fifteen years after the passage of the VAWA, victims of child 
pornography began to request restitution from those convicted of 
possessing, receiving, or distributing child pornography in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A.15  Congress made restitution for victims of 
child exploitation offenses, in particular possession of child pornography, 
mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 2259.16  An order of restitution under § 2259 
“shall direct the defendant to pay the victim . . . the full amount of the 
victim’s losses as determined by the court.”17  This statute confronted 
judges with a multitude of issues:  who are the “victims,” how can they be 
restored to their original state prior to the offense, and should they be 
compensated for their loss or should the focus be on the defendant’s gain by 
having unlawful images in his possession?   
Since 2009, few victims have requested restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 
2259—most restitution requests have come from two victims, known only 
as “Amy” and “Vicky.”18  “Amy” and “Vicky have requested 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 18 U.S.C. § 3663 
(2006). 
 14. See also Robert William Jacques, Note, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the 
Federal Restitution Framework for Child Pornography Victims, 45 GA. L. REV. 1167 
(2011); Michael A. Kaplan, Note, Mandatory Restitution: Ensuring That Possessors of Child 
Pornography Pay for Their Crimes, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531 (2011); Dina McLeod, Note, 
Section 2259 Restitution Claims and Child Pornography Possession, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
1327 (2011); Jennifer Rothman, Note, Getting What They Are Owed: Restitution Fees for 
Victims of Child Pornography, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 333 (2011). 
 15. In most of the cases discussed below, the defendant is charged with knowingly 
possessing material that contained images of child pornography which had been transported in 
interstate commerce by means of computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) or § 
2252(a)(4)(B).  There is a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for distribution or receipt 
of such materials and a maximum of twenty years under these statutes.  18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b).  
 16. Id. § 2259. 
 17. Id. 
 18. “Amy” is also referred to as the child in the “Misty” child pornography series.  “A 
‘series’ is a collection of child pornography images depicting the same victim or victims; 
they are traded online among those who deal in child pornography.”  United States v. Hardy, 
707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 2010).  “Amy” and “Vicky” have been used in court 
documents to protect their privacy. 
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$3,367,854.00 and $151,002.91, respectively, in multiple cases.19  “Amy” 
has requested restitution in 684 cases of possession, receipt, or distribution 
of child pornography, and in a survey of 116 of those cases from multiple 
judicial districts, she has been awarded a total of $11,939,821.00.20  
“Vicky’s” images are, unfortunately, associated with as many as 9200 cases 
around the country.21  In a survey of 153 cases in which “Vicky” has sought 
restitution, “Vicky” has been awarded a total of $2,739,145.50.22  The 
paperwork from the victim’s attorney is the same in each case, simply 
replicated for the new defendant, forwarded to the prosecutor, the federal 
district court, and defendant’s attorney, regardless of the jurisdiction in 
which the case is being adjudicated.  Some courts request additional 
information while others are satisfied with the dollar amount requested 
without further information.  The decisions by the federal district court 
judges are not the same however.  In some cases, the court has awarded the 
entire amount requested by the victim.23  In other cases, the courts have 
declined to order any type of restitution, typically because the court found 
no quantifiable loss that was proximately caused by the defendant’s offense 
of conviction.24  Still other courts have decided that the victim should 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Because of the nature of child pornography, images of a particular child will occur 
in many cases. The names “Amy” and “Vicky” appear in a large number of child 
pornography cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(using “Amy”); United States v. Patton, No. 09-43 PAM/JSM, 2010 WL 1006521 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 16, 2010) (using “Vicky”); United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (D. Me. 
2009) (using “Amy” and “Vicky”).  
 20. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011) petition for cert. filed, 2001 
WL 2877874, at *24 (U.S. July 15, 2011) (No. 11-85); see also Restitution Chart by Victim 
(May 12, 2011) (on file with authors) (surveying 116 of “Amy’s” cases in which she 
requested restitution; these restitution amounts reflect the amount awarded and not the actual 
amount received by the victim). 
 21. United States v. Brannon, No. 4:09-CR-38-RLV-WEJ, 2011 WL 2912862, at *9 
(N.D. Ga. May 26, 2011). 
 22. See Restitution Chart by Victim, supra note 20 (surveying 153 of “Vicky’s” cases in 
which she requested restitution; these restitution amounts reflect the amount awarded and 
not the actual amount received by the victim). 
 23. See, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App’x 377, 379 (9th Cir. 2010) (awarding 
$3000, the entire amount the government had requested); United States v. Staples, No. 09-
14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (awarding “Amy” 
$3,680,153); United States v. Freeman, No. 08-cr-00022-002, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
113942 (N.D. Fla. filed Aug. 5, 2009) (awarding to “Amy” $3,263,758). 
 24. United States v. Covert, Criminal No. 09-332, 2011 WL 134060 at *9 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 19, 2011); United States v. Rhodes, No. CR-10-14-M-DWM, 2011 WL 108951, at *3 
(D. Mont. Jan. 12, 2011); United States v. Rowe, No. 1:09CR80, 2010 WL 3522257, at *6 
(W.D. N.C. Sept. 7, 2010); United States v. Chow, 760 F. Supp. 2d 335, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 
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receive a percentage of the total loss and have typically awarded between 
$3,000 and $5,000 as the amount of harm caused by the possessor of the 
child pornography.25  There have also been a few cases in which the 
government and the defendant have stipulated to a restitution amount, 
taking the decision out of the hands of the judge.26 
The wide variety of judicial decisions make clear that judges are 
confused as to the method of calculation of restitution owed to victims of 
child pornography.  Title 18 U.S.C. § 2259, as written, is broken and must 
be fixed.  Such action is required to provide clarity to sentencing judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and to compensate the victim 
effectively while instilling a sense of fairness and justice in the issuance of 
an order to the defendant to pay the restitution. 
This article proceeds in four parts.  Part II examines the 18 U.S.C. § 
2259 restitution statute in detail in relation to the child pornography 
possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(5)(B).  This part describes the 
issues facing defense attorneys and prosecutors alike as they tackle § 2259 
                                                                                                                 
2010); United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2010); United States v. 
Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796-97 (D. N.D. 2010); Patton, 2010 WL 1006521 at *2; 
United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1113 (N.D. Iowa 2010); United States v. Van 
Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009); 
United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. 
Simon, No. CR-08-0907 DLJ, 2009 WL 2424673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009); United 
States v. Johnson, CR 08-218-01-KI (D. Or. May 19, 2009); Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 188. 
 25. United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ontiveros, 
No. 2:08-CR-81-JVB, 2011 WL 2447721 (N.D. Ind. June 15, 2011) (awarding 1% of losses or 
$4,500 in restitution); United States v. Lindauer, No. 3:10-cr-00023, 2011 WL 1225992, at *4 
(W.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011) (awarding 5% of total losses or $5,448 in restitution); United States v. 
Mather, No. 1:09-CR-00412 AWI, 2010 WL 5173029, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) 
(awarding $3,000); United States v. Brunner, No. 08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *5 (W.D. 
N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (awarding $6000 to “Amy” and $1500 to “Vicky”); United States v. Hicks, 
No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *5-6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (awarding $3000); 
United States v. Elhert, No. 3:09-CR-05203, judgment at 7-11 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2009) 
(awarding $1000 and $5000 to victims respectively for the number of images in defendant’s 
possession); United States v. Brown, No. 2:08-cr-1453-RGK-1, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113942 at *1 
(C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 5, 2009) (awarding $5000); United States v. Ferenci, No. 1:08-CR-0414 
AWI, 2009 WL 2579102, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. filed Aug. 19, 2009) (awarding $3000); United 
States v. Monk, No. 08-cr-0365 AWI, 2009 WL 2567831, at *6-7 (E.D. Ca. filed Aug. 18, 2009) 
(awarding $3000); United States v. Zane, No. 08-cr-00369 AWI, 2009 WL 2567832, at *6-7  
(E.D. Ca. filed Aug. 18, 2009) (awarding $3000).  
 26. United States v. Lubiewski, No. 09-cr-447 (E.D. Mo. filed Feb. 18, 2010) 
(“Vicky”); United States v. Traynor, No. 09-CR-00273 (D. N.J. Oct. 7, 2009); United States 
v. Granato, No. 2:08-cr-198 (D. Nev. filed Aug. 28, 2009); United States v. Hesketh, 08-cr-
165 (Conn. filed Feb. 23, 2009) (“Amy”). 
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restitution issues at the sentencing phase.  The gray areas of 18 U.S.C. § 
2259 are numerous:  what constitutes a “victim” in a child pornography 
case, whether the damages must be closely linked or the “proximate result” 
of the defendant’s possession of the images, whether joint and several 
liability should exist in this area, what must the victim do to support the 
damage amount requested, and what are the due process concerns in 
relation to imposing such a restitution order.  As each issue is addressed, a 
separate sub-section discusses possible solutions to issues faced by 
prosecutors and defense attorneys when arguing for or against § 2259 
claims and possible suggestions on how judges could more uniformly 
handle these problems. 
Part III proposes that Congress amend 18 U.S.C. § 2259 to provide 
guidance and consistency throughout the judicial system.  A system that 
determines the full amount owed to victims in the first instance, sets forth 
percentage guidelines by apportioning the defendant’s fault in relation to 
other co-defendants, orders restitution based upon apportioned liability, and 
permits victims to seek contribution from other co-defendants would allow 
the court to fashion a just apportionment of damages to each possessor 
faced with a restitution request.  The conclusory sub-sections in Part II, the 
proposals delineated in Part III, and Part IV’s conclusion have been written 
solely by Melanie Reid to serve as suggestions and guidelines to be used by 
practitioners, federal judges, or members of Congress.27 
II. The Issues Facing Mandatory Restitution Under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 
Initially, determining the basics of criminal restitution in federal criminal 
cases seems rather straightforward.  In fact, in a summary training outline 
on restitution, Assistant General Counsel for the United States Courts, 
Catherine M. Goodwin, spells out the five steps in determining specific 
restitution amounts: (1) “identify the offense of conviction in order to 
determine whether restitution is mandatory,” (2) “identify the victims of the 
offense,” (3) “identify the victims’ harms caused by the offense,” (4) 
“determine which harms (and/or costs) are statutorily compensable under 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Judge Collier collaborated on Part II of this article in an attempt to educate and 
acquaint practitioners and judges with the pitfalls and peculiarities of this issue.  Any 
advocacy or suggestions on policy issues are the opinions solely of co-author, Melanie Reid, 
as Judge Collier takes no position on any suggested proposals addressed below. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
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restitution,” and (5) “determine if the plea agreement broadens 
restitution.”28 
These five steps are easy to follow when awarding restitution in 
traditional cases.  For example, victims of a financial loss are easily 
identified whether the victim is a burglarized bank or an investor who fell 
for a Ponzi scheme.  There may be litigation about the size of the loss or 
whether the offender should pay interest on the loss, but conceptually there 
is no real dispute about whether a tangible financial loss occurred.  The 
offender appreciates why he must restore the victim’s tangible financial 
loss.  In the substantial majority of cases, there is a direct link between the 
offender and the victim.  With mail, wire, and internet fraud cases, the 
offender and victim might not have ever physically met, but there is still a 
direct link between the offender and victim. 
In contrast, only steps one and five appear to be relatively easy to 
interpret in the child pornography context.  It is clear that restitution is 
mandatory pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259 which provides that “the order of 
restitution under this section shall direct defendant to pay the victim” and 
that both the government and defendant can stipulate to a restitution amount 
in a plea agreement.29  Restitution in child pornography cases differs from 
tradition restitution payments, however, in several respects.  First, it 
difficult to identify who is a “victim” of the offense.  Second, monetizing 
victims’ harms can be challenging because of the inherently personal nature 
of the harm.  Third, it is unclear which harms are statutorily compensable as 
to the particular defendant. 
Child pornography cases thus depart from the traditional understanding 
of restitution in a variety of ways.  When the possessor of child 
pornography enters a guilty plea, it is unlikely he realizes and appreciates 
that his offense is such that he must financially restore someone.  One of 
the benefits of restitution in traditional cases is that the act of making the 
victim “whole” brings home to the offender the harmfulness of his/her 
actions, and this restorative act has deterrent value in and of itself.  This 
deterrent value is completely missing in child pornography cases.  In fact, 
the opposite effect may be present because offenders will think the order of 
                                                                                                                 
 28. CATHERINE M. GOODEN, U.S, SENTENCING COMM’N, RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CASES, SUMMARY TRAINING OUTLINE 4 (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Education_and_Training/Guidelines_Educational_Materials/trainnew.pdf.  
 29. The statutes governing the sexual exploitation of children are found under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2251-2258 (2006).  The mandatory restitution requirement for these offenses is found at 
18 U.S.C. § 2259. 
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restitution is unjust due to the extremely large restitution award granted the 
victim which could lead to non-acceptance of the fairness of the sentence.30 
Another distinction, of course, is there will rarely be a direct link between 
the victim and the offender (as will be discussed in Part II.B).  The possessor 
and the victim have almost certainly never met.  Moreover, the victim and 
possessor may be separated by great distances with the defendant being in the 
United States and the victim in Eastern Europe or elsewhere.  There is also a 
separation of time.  The victim’s photograph may have been taken many years 
ago and just recently accessed and possessed by the defendant.  The last 
distinction is that the types of losses listed in § 2259 are not the types of 
injuries or damages recognized in typical restitution cases.  Bernard Madoff’s 
Ponzi scheme doubtless led to victims experiencing psychiatric or 
psychological injury when they learned their life savings were gone and they 
were destitute.  However, the consequential damages found in child 
pornography possession cases are generally not part of typical restitution 
litigation or awards in federal court.31 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. 
 31. Most restitution cases require the defendant to restore any gains he or she made in the 
process of committing the crime.  DOBBS, supra note 8, at 1047.  Child pornography restitution 
cases are rather unique because they focus on the victim’s losses rather than any gains made by 
the defendant.  Focusing on the victim’s losses would lead one to believe the term “damages” 
would also apply.  However, the terms “losses” and “damages” are not synonymous.  Damages, 
which “refers to the monetary award for legally recognized harm,” is “distinct from restitution.”  
Id.  “Loss” is defined as “[a]n undesirable outcome of a risk; the disappearance or diminution of 
value, usually in an unexpected or relatively unpredictable way.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1029 (9th ed. 2009). “Damages” is defined as “[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a 
person as compensation for loss or injury.”  Id. at 445.  In tort law, damages can include non-
pecuniary losses for physical pain and suffering, mental or emotional distress, fright and shock, 
anxiety about the future, loss of peace of mind, happiness, mental health, humiliation, 
embarrassment, or loss of dignity, loss of the ability to enjoy a normal life, inconvenience, etc.  
Title 18, § 2259 of the U.S. Code muddies up the water by referring to “losses” incurred by the 
victim and includes items that are covered under civil damages such as medical services, lost 
income, attorney’s fees, and any other general losses which are all usually covered in civil 
damages.  However, it is imperative to remember restitution (a victim’s recovery of losses) was 
not necessarily meant to cover everything one is entitled to under civil damages (such as pain 
and suffering, mental or emotional distress, etc.).  For example, if an end-user sports bar pirated 
cable channels from Direct TV, Direct TV would ask for restitution in the amount of profit lost 
those months the end-user watched the pirated channels.  See generally Anti-Fraud Enforcement 
Actions: The Truth, http://hackhu.com/news_archive.php.  Direct TV would not include pain and 
suffering as part of their losses.  Even if the “victim” was an actual person rather than an 
inanimate entity such as Direct TV, emotional damages would not be considered “losses” under 
the general restitution statutes.  Those emotional damages would only be covered in a civil suit 
and not considered during a criminal restitution hearing. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
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From this complex perspective, everyone involved in a child pornography 
possession case must look at restitution with a completely new and different 
mindset.  The defense attorney must put out of his or her mind much of what 
they knew or thought they knew about restitution in federal sentencing. 
Further, unlike typical restitution cases where restoring the victim is the 
purported intent, the unstated goal in child pornography cases is punitive, 
not restorative.  Much of what would be considered as a mitigating factor 
against restitution in other cases is not present in child pornography cases.  
Foremost, it is irrelevant whether the offender has the ability to pay 
restitution because restitution awards are lifetime obligations.  This means 
in some child pornography cases the defendant will be saddled with a very 
large restitution order that the offender will most likely never be able to pay 
and no one will ever be able to collect.32  It is therefore helpful in this 
context to think of restitution more in the nature of a criminal fine. 
As a group, child pornography offenders are distinctive.  Statistically, the 
offender is a middle-aged white male, who, in possessing child 
pornography, is committing his first offense.33  He has a solid work history, 
and likely has at least a college education.34  Prior to his conviction, he has 
been able to earn a decent salary, but after a criminal conviction and 
lengthy prison sentence, his future earning capacity post-prison is dismal.35 
It would behoove accused offenders in child pornography cases and their 
defense attorneys to realize that the underlying intent of restitution in these 
cases is not to make some victim whole but rather to punish the offender 
further.  With this realization, the offender has a better chance of mounting 
a rigorous defense against unjust restitution.  Indeed, child pornography 
cases are the fastest growing type of case in federal prosecutions.36  While 
these cases make up only about 2.3% of federal sentencing orders, this 
                                                                                                                 
 32. This too explains why proximate cause is somewhat irrelevant and why each 
offender must pay the “full amount of the victim’s losses.”  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3); see 
discussion supra Part II. 
 33. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, 
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/SBTOC1
0.htm; JANIS WOLAK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD-
PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL ONLINE JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 1-3 (2005), available at  http://www. 
missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf. 
 34. WOLAK ET AL., supra note 33, at 2-3. 
 35. Id. at 3.  
 36. Id. 
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growth is larger than any other type of federal crime.37  More and more 
practitioners will be facing these issues and be prepared to grapple with 
them in the courtroom setting.  The following sections A-E identify specific 
issues facing practitioners in these types of cases. 
A. Who Is Considered a “Victim” When the Offender “Merely” Possesses 
Child Pornography? 
1. The “Victim” Issue Identified 
In order to request and receive restitution, a victim must suffer harm 
from the offender’s conduct.  Some defendants in child pornography cases 
argue that the harm occurred when the image was created, and not when 
viewed by the possessor, thereby negating the premise that the child is a 
“victim” in the specific case of possession only.38  Those who feel they are 
the “victim” and request restitution typically do so because they feel each 
time the photograph or video is viewed, more harm is added to the initial 
injury of being sexually abused.39  The child in the images may feel shame, 
humiliation and fear that individuals, such as the defendant/possessor, are 
watching these images, victimizing the child each time they are viewed.  
The child is aware that his/her images were viewed because federal 
prosecutors are required to notify potential victims that someone found to 
be in possession of said images is being prosecuted.40 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. OFFENDERS IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE 
CATEGORY fig. A (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_ 
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/FigureA.pdf; Fact Sheet: Project Safe Childhood, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.projectsafechildhood.gov/docs/factsheet.pdf (last visited June 
16, 2012).  The issues surrounding section 2259 of the child pornography restitution statute 
have been raised in many federal courts recently.  See United States v. Wright, 639 F.3d 679, 
682 (5th Cir. 2011); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, [2010] SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 13 (15th ed. 2011). 
 38. See United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105-06 (N.D. Iowa 2010); 
United States v. Patton, No. 09-43 PAM/JSM, 2010 WL 1006521 at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 
2010); United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819 (W.D. Va. 2010); United States v. 
Chow, 760 F. Supp. 2d 335, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); United States v. Brunner, No. 08-CR-
16, 2010 WL 148433, at *5 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 12, 2010); United States v. Van Brackle, No. 
2:08-CR-042-WCO 2009 WL 492805,0 at *2-4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2009); United States v. 
Staples, No. 09-14017 CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009); United States 
v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 785 (E.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-
150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *5-6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009); United States v. Berk, 666 F. 
Supp. 2d 182, 185-86 (D. Me. 2009).  
 39. See infra note 67 (summarizing a typical victim statement). 
 40. Images found on a defendant’s computer as a result of a search warrant are typically 
submitted to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) which 
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The various restitution statutes differ in defining “victim.”  The general 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, which is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 
3663A(a)(2) and § 3663(a)(2), states that “the term ‘victim’ means a person 
directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense 
for which restitution may be ordered.”41  The VAWA restitution statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2259(c), states that “‘victim’ means the individual harmed as a 
result of a commission of a crime under this chapter.”  The requirement that 
the individual must be “harmed as a result of the commission” of a crime 
under § 2259 is a lesser standard than the “directly and proximately 
harmed” requirement of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A, which address 
general criminal restitution.  It is logical to suggest that § 2259’s 
requirement of “harm” rather than “direct and proximate harm” lends itself 
to a broader range of “victims” than any other federal restitution statute.42 
Defendants’ threshold argument that children found in photographic 
images are not “victims” in child pornography possession cases has not 
fared well.  Most courts, even those that eventually deny restitution, have 
found that the children in the images are “victims” harmed as a result of the 
                                                                                                                 
maintains a collection of images of child pornography made using known, real children 
under the age of eighteen.  See Child Victim Identification Program (CVIP), NAT’L CTR. FOR 
MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/Page 
Servlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=2444 (last visited June 20, 2012).  NCMEC then 
identifies from their database any known children under the age of eighteen and forwards 
this to the government.  Id.  Federal prosecutors must provide victims of crime with notice of 
certain developments in their case.  18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (2006).  In child pornography 
cases, only the victim who has requested notification of a found image will be notified via 
the Victim Notification System (VNS). OFFICE FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, FEDERAL BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY VICTIMS BROCHURE, http:// 
www.fbi.gov/stats-services/victim_assistance/cpva (last visited July 31, 2012). The VNS is a 
computerized system that provides notice both via regular mail and email. OFFICE FOR 
VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND 
WITNESS ASSISTANCE 13 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/ag_guide 
lines.pdf. Victims may then submit impact statements and request for restitution. Id. at 32-
33, 37-43. A victim is not required to request or participate in any phase of a restitution 
order.  18 U.S.C. § 3664(g)(1).  Sixty days before sentencing, the government attorney, 
“after consulting, to the extent practicable, with all identified victims, shall promptly provide 
the probation officer with a listing of the amounts subject to restitution.”  Id. § 3664(d)(1). 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 3663. 
 42. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) also states, “For the purposes of this chapter, the term 
‘crime victim’ means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the 
commission of a Federal offense.”  Id. § 3771(e).  In another context, the Supreme Court has 
discussed the need to pay close attention to any meaningful variation among similar statutes.  
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (giving weight to different 
phrases used by Congress). 
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possession/viewing, and that these children should be allowed to allege any 
losses suffered as a result of the crime.43  Many courts cite New York v. 
Ferber for support: 
Sexual molestation by adults is often involved in the production 
of child sexual performances.  When such performances are 
recorded and distributed, the child’s privacy interests are also 
invaded . . . .  [P]ornography poses an even greater threat to the 
child victim than does sexual abuse or prostitution.  Because the 
child’s actions are reduced to a recording, the pornography may 
haunt him in future years, long after the original misdeed took 
place.  A child who has posed for a camera must go through life 
knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass 
distribution system for child pornography.44 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Chow, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39; Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 820; Patton, 2010 WL 
1006521, at *2; Van Brackle, 2009 WL 4928050, at *3; Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 789; 
Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 188 n.5. 
 44. 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 and 759 n.10 (internal citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (“[T]he continued circulation itself would 
harm the child who had participated. . . . each new publication of the speech would cause 
new injury to the child’s reputation and emotional well-being.”).  The Senate seemed to 
quote New York v. Ferber, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), when discussing an amendment to 
legislation on offenses of sexual exploitation:  
Because the child’s actions are reduced to recordings, the pornography may 
haunt him in future years, long after the original misdeed took place.  A child 
who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the recording is 
circulating within the mass distribution system of child pornography . . . .  It is 
the fear of exposure and the tension of keeping the act secret that seems to have 
the most profound emotional repercussions.  
S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 14 (1996) (quoting Bill to Amend Certain Provisions of Law 
Relating to Child Pornography and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th  Cong. (1996) (statement of Sen. Biden, Member, S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary)); see also United States v. Santa-Cruz, 127 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that possession of child pornography causes continuing injury); United States v. 
Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The possession, receipt and shipping of child 
pornography directly victimizes the children portrayed by violating their right to privacy, 
and in particular violating their individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal 
matters.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that “the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 made clear that the primary 
objective of the provision was to lessen the harm suffered by children”); United States v. 
Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998) (“children depicted in the child pornography 
distributed and possessed by a defendant who are the primary victims . . . .”); United States 
v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he legislative history, when viewed in its 
entirety, confirms the conclusion that the primary ‘victims’ that Congress sought to protect 
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The Fifth Circuit has also addressed the concern as to whether a child 
found in images possessed by the defendant was a “victim” under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2259 and entitled to restitution.45  The court has explained that the 
possessors provide an economic incentive for the creation of the images, 
thereby keeping the child’s images in circulation:  “The consumer who 
‘merely’ or ‘passively’ receives or possesses child pornography directly 
contributes to this continuing victimization therefore the recipient may be 
considered to be invading the privacy of the children depicted, directly 
victimizing these children.”46  Congress has also stated that a child found in 
pornographic images is a “victim” because each possession/viewing is a 
repetition of the sexual abuse.47   
2. Conclusions 
Based upon current judicial interpretation and congressional intent, a 
defendant will likely fail in his argument that the child depicted in the 
pornography the defendant possessed or viewed is:  (1) not a victim within 
the meaning of § 2259 or (2) not harmed by defendant’s conduct.  The 
victim will have the right to be heard at the defendant’s sentencing and/or 
restitution hearing if his or her images were found on the defendant’s 
computer or in his possession.48  Congress has placed great emphasis on the 
victim’s rights after passing a series of victim witness protection and 
restitution acts:  1982 (VWPA), 1984 (Sentencing Reform Act), 1994 
(VAWA), 1996 (MVRA), and most recently the Justice for All Act of 2004, 
so that no judge, defendant, or prosecutor could deny a victim’s day in 
court.49 
                                                                                                                 
by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 2252, were in fact, the children involved in the production of 
pornography.”). 
 45. United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 46. Id. at 930.  
 47. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 
501(1)(A), (2)(D), 120 Stat. 587, 623-24.  Congress stated that 
the illegal production, transportation, distribution, receipt, advertising and 
possession of child pornography . . . is harmful to the psychological, emotional, 
and mental health of the children depicted in child pornography and has a 
substantial and detrimental effect on society as a whole. . . . Every instance of 
viewing images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of the 
privacy of victims and a repetition of their abuse. 
Id. 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 3664. 
 49. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3771, the Justice for All Act of 2004, also known as the Crime 
Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), amends the federal criminal code to grant crime victims 
specified rights, including: 
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B. Is the Defendant’s Act of Possession a “Proximate” Cause of the 
Victim’s Harm? 
1. The “Proximate” Cause Issue Identified 
Next, the courts must then decide whether the defendant was a proximate 
cause of the harm alleged by the victim.  Causation is a tricky concept in 
any law school torts class.  And it is the most difficult argument the victim 
must make when requesting restitution under § 2259.  Was the possessor of 
child pornography a proximate cause of a victim’s harm?  If the answer is 
yes, then the courts must decide if the possessor was a cause or responsible 
party for all or only partial harm to the victim.  While an alleged “victim” 
may have little difficulty in proving some generalized harm based solely on 
child pornography images of that individual being discovered on some 
offender’s computer, it is another matter entirely to request and recover the 
“full amount of the victim’s losses” from the particular possessor.  The “full 
amount of the victim’s losses” under § 2259 includes:  
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or 
psychological care; 
                                                                                                                 
 (1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. 
 (2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court 
proceeding or any parole proceeding involving the crime, or of any release or 
escape of the accused. 
 (3) The right not to be excluded from any such public proceeding, unless the 
court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony 
by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard testimony at that 
proceeding. 
 (4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district 
court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding. 
 (5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in 
the case. 
 (6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided by the law. 
 (7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. 
 (8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s 
dignity and privacy. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a) (West 2011) (emphasis added). Section 3771(c)(1) provides that 
“[o]fficers and employees of the Department of Justice and other departments and agencies 
of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall 
make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded the rights 
described in [CVRA].”  18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1).  “The crime victim or the crime victim’s 
lawful representative . . . may assert the rights described in [the CVRA]”  Id. § 3771(d)(1).  
Under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), the Financial Litigation Unit of the 
United States Attorney’s Office collects the restitution for a period of twenty years from the 
time of sentencing plus any incarceration time.  18 U.S.C. § 3663. 
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(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; 
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care 
expenses; 
(D) lost income; 
(E) attorney’s fees, as well as other costs incurred; and  
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result 
of the offense.50 
Judges must decide to award restitution based on the harm the victim 
suffered as a result of either the defendant’s possession or if the defendant 
is responsible for the “full amount” of losses suffered as a result of the 
initial injury and additional victimizations each time the image was traded, 
distributed, possessed and viewed.  Defendants argue that there is a 
proximate cause requirement between the victim’s losses and the particular 
defendant’s conduct.51  Defendants further argue that they should only be 
responsible for the additional harm of the image(s) being viewed and 
                                                                                                                 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(F) (emphasis added).  Interestingly, Congress did not 
include embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety, loss of reputation, or loss of earning capacity 
in the specified losses.  These, in theory, are included in the “any other losses” category 
which requires proximate cause. 
 51. Under tort law, proximate cause is concerned with policy considerations limiting the 
scope of liability and the idea of remoteness and fairness in holding a defendant accountable 
only for foreseeable consequences of his/her actions.  DOBBS, supra note 8, at 450.  If the driver 
of a truck begins to type a text message on his cell phone and fails to see the traffic light has 
turned red and hits an oncoming car due to his carelessness, the truck driver is liable as a 
proximate cause of the other driver’s/victim’s injuries.  However, should we hold the truck 
driver’s mother liable for the accidents as well?  But for the truck driver being born, this accident 
would never have occurred in the first place, thereby satisfying the actual causation requirement.  
Yet, the mother will undoubtedly not be held liable because of the proximate cause requirement -
- giving birth to a son who becomes a truck driver later in life is not an act in which a future 
injury/car accident caused by her son would be reasonably foreseeable.  The same policy 
arguments as to proximate cause apply here; yet, in this scenario the possessor is not an innocent 
third-party like the mother.  The possessor of the child pornography would be similar to a rescue 
worker who caused additional injury to the victim after the accident occurred.  The producer of 
the child pornography, similar to the truck driver, created the initial injury to the victim.  See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 250 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984)) (“As a practical matter, legal responsibility must 
be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance 
that the law is justified in imposing liability.  Some boundary must be set to liability for the 
consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.”).  
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possessed by that particular defendant, which is the only injury that was 
foreseeable as a consequence of his conduct.52 
More specifically, as applied to § 2259, it is unclear whether the term 
“proximate result” that is found in section (f) refers only to “any other losses 
suffered by the victim” or whether there is a proximate result requirement to all 
the losses, including those stated in sections (a) through (e).  This appears to be 
the crux of most judges’ disagreement in determining the specific restitution 
amount.  In In re Amy, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the proximate cause 
requirement is only applicable to “any other losses” in section (F) of 2259(b)(3):  
“As a general proposition, it makes sense that Congress would impose an 
additional proximate cause restriction on the catchall category of ‘other losses’ 
that does not apply to the defined categories.  By construction, Congress knew 
the kinds of expenses necessary for restitution under subsections A through E.  
On the other hand, Congress could not anticipate what victims would propose 
under the open-ended ‘any other losses’ subsection F.”53  Under the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation, the victim would be entitled to recover all costs 
associated with sections (A) through (E) without alleging the particular 
defendant directly or proximately caused the harm, but rather by alleging 
generalized harm (as discussed in Part II section A in relation to the term 
“victim”).  However, in the undefined “any other losses” catchall category in 
section (f), the victim need allege how exactly the particular defendant caused 
the “other” harm.  Therefore, the inclusion of the phrase “proximate result” in 
the last of the enumerated sections on types of losses means that such a 
requirement is not needed for the other types of losses.54  The Seventh Circuit 
appears to have agreed in United States v. Danser, when it stated:  “[I]n enacting 
                                                                                                                 
 52. United States v. Strayer, No. 8:08CR482, 2010 WL 2560466, at *10, *15 (D. Neb. June 
24, 2010); United States v. Raplinger, No. 05-CR-49-LRR, 2007 WL 3285802, at *2-6 (N.D. 
Iowa Oct. 9, 2007); In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Laney, 189 
F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 53. 636 F.3d 190, 198-99 (5th Cir. 2011).  The Fifth Circuit also used the grammar 
found in the statute to support its argument:  “Here the statute does not present the types of 
recoverable costs in a series, separated by commas.  Instead, it begins a sentence (‘full 
amount of the victim’s losses’ includes any costs incurred by the victim for—’) and then 
lists six different endings for that sentence.”  Id. at 199.  The significance of the “double-
dash” before the list of losses is that it separates each loss section from the other, and the 
semicolons in between each loss section separates each section even further.  Id. 
 54. The Fifth Circuit rejected the proposition that Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. 
Mor, 253 U.S. 345 (1920), controls when analyzing the grammatical structure of § 
2259(b)(3).  In re Amy, 636 F.3d 190, 199-200 (5th Cir. 2011).  The Supreme Court stated 
in Porto Rico that “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as 
much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language 
demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.”  253 U.S. at 348.   
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section 2259, it is clear that Congress intended to provide victims of sexual 
abuse with expansive relief for the full amount of . . . [their] losses suffered as a 
result of abuse.  Congress chose unambiguously to use unqualified language in 
prescribing full restitution for victims.”55  
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Laney, held that 
§ 2259 incorporates a requirement of proximate causation on all categories 
of claims—that there must be a causal connection between the offense of 
conviction and the victim’s harm.56  Other courts have agreed, determining 
that the offense of conviction must be a “substantial factor” in the victim’s 
losses,57 and that any loss suffered by a victim must be “a proximate result 
of the offenses of conviction.”58  In United States v. McDaniel, the Eleventh 
Circuit also determined that when using general principles of statutory 
construction, a general proximate cause requirement should be read 
backwards from (F) through the preceding sections (A)-(E).59  
The District of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Monzel, has 
recently followed the Ninth, Third, and Eleventh Circuits’ lead in deciding 
proximate cause is required in all categories specified in § 2259(b)(3)(A)-
(F) and not just in (F), basing its decision on “traditional principles of tort 
and criminal law.”  “It is a bedrock rule of both tort and criminal law that a 
defendant is only liable for harms he proximately caused . . . nothing in the 
text or structure of § 2259 leads us to conclude that Congress intended to 
negate the ordinary requirement of proximate cause.”60 
To further its argument that proximate cause applies in all categories of § 
2259(b)(3), the D.C. Circuit found that the definition of “victim” in § 
2259(c) that a person must be harmed “as a result of” the defendant’s 
offense of possession “invokes the standard rule that a defendant is liable 
only for harms that he proximately caused . . . [t]hat the definition does not 
include an express requirement of proximate cause makes no difference.”61  
                                                                                                                 
 55. United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th cir. 2001). 
 56. 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 57. Crandon, 174 F.3d at 126. 
 58. Raplinger, 2007 WL 3285802, at *2; see also United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04-Cr-
340, 2009 WL 2383025, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009) (entering a restitution order of 
one-third the amount requested by the victim because only that amount was proximately 
caused by the offense of conviction). 
 59. 631 F.3d 1204, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 60. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 61. Id. at 536.  The Court in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413, 421 (1990), stated 
that the statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580 (2006), authorized restitution “only for the loss caused 
by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.”  In Hughey, the defendant 
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The Fifth Circuit counters by arguing that this definition of “victim” in § 
2259(c) demands more of a general causation requirement than a proximate 
cause requirement.62  The Fifth Circuit points to other restitution statutes, 
such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(2) and 3663(a)(2), which define “victim” in 
terms which would cause the reader to believe a specific proximate cause 
requirement is necessary, in that the definition specifically states that the 
“victim” be “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the 
commission of an offense.”63 
District court judges differ as to whether a general proximate cause 
requirement applies to all categories or just to the catch-all category (F).  As 
the district court judge in United States v. Monk, opined, “[t]he only 
monetary figure provided to the court is the total amount of the victim’s 
harm, not the harm Defendant Monk caused a particular victim.”64  The 
judge found it difficult, if not impossible, to separate the amount of harm 
caused by the defendant/possessor from the amount caused by other 
possessors and in effect, required a proximate cause requirement in all 
categories.65  Another judge in United States v. Berk determined that the 
losses alleged were generalized and caused by the idea of the victims’ 
images being viewed by the public at large rather than caused by the 
particular defendant having viewed their images.66  Since the losses alleged 
were not specifically linked to the defendant’s conduct, nor was there any 
mention as to what the impact was on the victims upon learning of the 
defendant’s offense, the judge denied restitution.67  On the other hand, in 
                                                                                                                 
pled guilty to the misuse of one credit card, and the district court ordered the defendant to pay 
restitution for only the “loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of 
conviction.”  Id. at 413.  Thus, under the VWPA, “the government must show not only that a 
particular loss would not have occurred but for the conduct underlying the offense of conviction, 
but also that the causal nexus between the conduct and the loss is not too attenuated (either 
factually or temporally).”  United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 590 (1st Cir. 1997).  Under the 
MVRA, the First Circuit also ruled that there must be a clear causal link that “a particular loss 
would not have occurred but for the conduct underlying the offense of conviction” and that the 
link between the defendant’s conduct and the loss must not be “too attenuated.”  United States v. 
Cutter, 313 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Vaknin, 112 F.3d at 589-90). 
 62. In re Amy, 636 F.3d 190, 198-99 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 63. Id. at 199 n.10 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)).  
 64. United States v. Monk, No. 1:08-CR-0365AWI, 2009 WL 2567831, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 18, 2009). 
 65. Id. 
 66. 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191 (D. Me. 2009). 
 67. Id. at 192-93.  One of the victims in Berk told Dr. Silberg: “Everyday I have to live 
in fear of these pictures being seen.”  Psychological Evaluation by Dr. Joyanna Silberg at 4, 
Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182 (No. 08-CR-212-P-S). 
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United States v. Staples, the judge easily found the victim was specifically 
harmed by the defendant’s possession of images depicting her sexual abuse 
as a child.68 
2. Conclusions 
Does the proximate cause requirement only pertain to “any other losses” 
in section F of § 2259(b)(3) as argued by the Fifth Circuit?  Or is a finding 
of proximate cause applicable to medical costs, lost income, and attorney’s 
fees in sections A-E as it is to “any other losses”?  “Amy” recently filed a 
petition in the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on this 
very issue.69  This debate goes to the heart of what needs to be fixed in the § 
2259 restitution statute.  Thanks to legislative history and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ferber, victims can easily connect a generalized harm 
to each defendant’s conduct of possessing and viewing pornographic 
images depicting the victim.  Child pornography creates “a permanent 
record of the children’s participation [in sexual activity,] and the harm to 
the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”70  Thus, the generalized harm 
would include the invasion of the victim’s privacy, the creation of an 
economic motive to keep distributing the images, and the “new injury to the 
child’s reputation and emotional well-being,”71 fear, and isolation as a 
result of the additional viewing by the particular defendant.72 
                                                                                                                 
She fears the discovery of the pictures by her friends, but she also fears the 
unknown and unnamed people who continue to be looking at these pictures of 
her for their own perverse interests or to “groom” other children into these acts.  
She feels continually violated when she contemplates these possibilities.  As 
Amy stated, “I don’t want to be there, but I have to be there and it’s never 
going away, and that’s a scary thought.” 
Id. 
 68. No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009). 
 69. Petition for a Writ of Ceriorari, Amy v. Monzel, No. 11-85, 2011 WL 2877874 
(2011); see also Staples, 2009 WL 2827204, petition for cert. filed, (filed Mar. 11, 2011) 
(No. 10-1132). 
 70. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 18 (1996) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 
(1982)).  The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that “[c]hild pornography permanently 
records the victim’s abuse [and] can cause continuing harm to the depicted individual for 
years to come.”  Id. at 8. 
 71. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002).  
 72. Id. at 249 (2002) (“[A]s a permanent record of a child’s abuse, the continued 
circulation [of child pornography] itself would harm the child who had participated.  Like a 
defamatory statement, each new publication of the speech would cause new injury to the 
child’s reputation and emotional well-being.”); see United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750 
(3rd Cir. 1994) (finding that child pornography is an “affront to the dignity and privacy of 
the child and an exploitation of the child’s vulnerability”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/7
2012] WHEN DOES RESTITUTION BECOME RETRIBUTION? 673 
 
 
A proximate cause requirement by all categories in § 2259(b)(3)(a)-(f) 
would demand that the defendant only be liable for foreseeable consequences 
and would require more than an allegation of generalized harm.  According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, proximate cause is either “[a] cause that is legally 
sufficient to result in liability; an act or omission that is considered in law to 
result in a consequence, so that liability can be imposed on the actor” or “[a] 
cause that directly produces an event and without which the event would not 
have occurred.”73  In tort law, the concept of proximate cause is concerned 
with policy issues limiting a defendant’s liability to risks the defendant 
directly or foreseeably created.74  Courts have placed both a proximate cause 
requirement on negligence claims and an actual causation requirement (in 
which the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was the cause-in-fact of the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff).75  
In cases where the harm to the plaintiff is extremely widespread 
involving multiple parties that contributed to the ultimate resulting injury or 
where the magnitude of the injury is grossly out of proportion to the 
defendant’s negligent conduct, the element of proximate cause is critical to 
the judge’s analysis.76  Liability of the defendant must begin and end in 
some logical form.  A proximate cause requirement provides the judges 
with a safety net so that just as in civil negligence cases, a criminal judge 
can limit the defendant’s responsibility for the harm caused to the victim to 
harms which are foreseeable.  It is foreseeable that a possessor’s demand 
for child pornography creates an economic incentive for the creation and 
distribution of more child pornography.  It is also foreseeable that the 
defendant’s viewing of the victim’s images would invade the victim’s 
privacy and exacerbate the victim’s initial sexual abuse.  The sexual abuse 
while filming or photographing the victim would not have occurred but for 
the possessor’s demand for the images.  Congress chose to write § 
2259(b)(3) so that judges would take into consideration the total harm 
suffered by the victim in the form of medical services, therapy or 
rehabilitation, transportation, housing, child care expenses, lost income, and 
attorney’s fees.  There appears to be no limiting language, and therefore, 
arguably no proximate cause requirement.77  The only explicit proximate 
                                                                                                                 
 73. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (9th ed. 2009). 
 74. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 448-50. 
 75. Id. at 447-48. 
 76. United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 830 (W.D. Va. 2010). 
 77. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3) appears to differ from the VWPA causation standard.  
The First Circuit stated in a VWPA case: 
[W]e hold that a modified but for standard of causation is appropriate for 
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cause requirement is found in the final category of “any other losses.”78  In 
this category, Congress attempts to place limits on the potentially unlimited 
circle of liability.  If there are additional losses suffered by the victim, the 
victim must show that these losses are foreseeable consequences flowing 
from the defendant’s own conduct.  The victim must show that she suffered 
an additional loss particular to the defendant’s conduct above and beyond 
what harm she had already experienced.   
Determining that the defendant is responsible for the total harm, including 
the initial injury to the victim and limiting the proximate cause requirement to 
the “any other losses” category makes some sense.  But for the possessor 
soliciting the child pornography, the initial injury would not have occurred in 
the first place, and the possessor’s demand feeds the supplier.  The harm 
suffered by the victim is intertwined in the possessor’s desire to possess and 
view the images.79  Moreover, it would be extremely difficult to identify the 
specific harm that a particular defendant caused by viewing the victim’s image 
rather than looking at the total harm that the victim has experienced as a result 
of the production, distribution, and possession of her images.  But if the victim 
chooses to request additional restitution amounts for pain and suffering, 
humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress, etc., the victim must 
specifically tie these losses to the possessor’s conduct.  This places a limit on a 
victim’s losses and gives judges some discretion to decide what additional 
restitution amounts are warranted. 
The key issue to be determined here is the apportionment of liability.  
Assume that the defendant, along with others, is liable for the total harm 
caused to the victim because the court determined the victim’s alleged 
losses were a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions.  Should 
                                                                                                                 
restitution under the VWPA.  This means, in effect, that the government must 
show not only that a particular loss would not have occurred but for the conduct 
underlying the offense of conviction, but also that the causal nexus between the 
conduct and the loss is not too attenuated (either factually or temporally).  The 
watchword is reasonableness.  A sentencing court should undertake an 
individualized inquiry; what constitutes sufficient causation can only be 
determined case by case, in a fact-specific probe.   
United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 589-90 (1st Cir. 1997) (ordering restitution to the 
bank only for outstanding fraudulent loans and not other loans owed that were not procured 
by fraud), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Anonymous Defendant, 629 F.3d 
68 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(F). 
 79. However, this argument leaves out the role the distributor or redistributor plays in 
the chain of responsibility.  The distributor or redistributor is more active in meeting the 
supply of child pornography, and thus is a more culpable character in creating the demand. 
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the single defendant bear the total cost of the victim’s losses or merely a 
portion?80  
C. Should Apportionment Apply to the “Full Amount of the Victim’s 
Losses” Under §2259(B)(3) When Multiple Offenders Are Involved, or 
Should Each Offender Be Held Fully Liable? 
1. The Joint Liability Issue Identified 
Multiple parties contributed to the resulting harm to the victim in these 
child pornography cases.  Such persons include the producer of the images, 
the distributors or re-distributors of the images, and criminal defendant who 
possesses illicit images.  In civil cases, once the defendant has been found to 
have actually and proximately caused harm to the plaintiff (as well as other 
co-defendants and/or non-parties to the lawsuit), the court must decide 
whether the harm done to the plaintiff is divisible or indivisible.81  If the injury 
is divisible, then the defendant is liable only for his share of the plaintiff’s 
injury and the victim may recover from each wrongdoer the damages that said 
wrongdoer caused.82  Conversely, if the injury is indivisible, then the jury does 
not apportion liability amongst the wrongdoers because the defendants cannot 
demonstrate what portion of the total damage he or she caused.83  Defendants 
                                                                                                                 
 80. If the defendant is held liable only for the harm he/she caused the victim (and 
therefore, the judge applied the proximate cause element to the total amount of harm alleged 
by the victim), then there is no need to address this question.  The defendant is then merely 
held accountable for the injuries he specifically caused, and the argument in question C need 
not be addressed.  The judge in Berk found that the possessor’s viewing of the images was 
not the proximate cause of a specific injury to the plaintiff.  666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191-93 (D. 
Me. 2009).  If the victim was not aware that the defendant had viewed the images, then the 
viewing could not result in harm to the victim which was later alleged as losses in 
consideration for restitution.  Id. at 191 n.8. 
 81. See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 201-03 (Lexis Nexis, 4th ed. 
2010). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Dauenhauer v. Sullivan, 30 Cal. Rptr. 71, 74 (Ct. App. 1963) (“Appellants, on the other 
hand, contend that the rule set forth in the cases cited by respondent is totally inapplicable when 
the acts of the independent tortfeasors have united in causing one single and indivisible result 
such as the destruction of appellants' house. We agree. In Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co. (1950) 
35 Cal.2d 409, 433-34, 218 P.2d 17, 32, the court stated the rule as follows: ‘Where several 
persons act in concert and damages result from their joint tort, each person is held for the entire 
damages unless segregation as to causation can be established. Even though persons are not 
acting in concert, if the result produced by their acts are indivisible, each person is held liable for 
the whole. . . . The reason for imposing liability on each for the entire consequence is that there 
exists no basis for dividing damages and the law is loath to permit an innocent plaintiff to suffer 
as against a wrongdoing defendant.”); Piner v. Superior Court, 962 P.2d 909, 916 (Ariz. 1999) 
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should always argue the injury to the victim is divisible so as to only be 
responsible for the harm they specifically caused, though it may prove to be 
difficult to separate the possessor’s injury to the victim from the actions of the 
initial producer, distributors, and other possessors.  More than likely, judges 
will tend to find that the defendant is jointly and severally liable because the 
injury to the victim is indivisible.84  The production, distribution, and 
possession of each image combine to form a single, indivisible result.  Each 
defendant’s act (as the producer, the distributor, or possessor) is essential to 
the victim’s overall injury.  Since there are successive injuries to the victim 
each time her image is viewed, it is impossible to determine which defendant 
caused which injury (unless a particular defendant can adequately prove the 
limit of his liability).85  In addition, there may be future defendants as yet 
undetected (and thus not prosecuted) that have viewed or will view in the 
future the images of the victim forever stored in the internet.  This type of 
scenario lends itself to joint and several liability.  While the idea of holding the 
defendant accountable for the entire financial loss amount appears to be unfair 
to the  possessor (in relation to the culpability of the producer or distributors), 
the idea behind joint and several liability is that between the innocent injured 
party and multiple responsible parties, the injured party should be made 
whole.  And that means the responsible parties should have to resolve their 
relative shares among themselves by seeking contribution from each other.86   
While § 2259 does not explicitly address this particular issue, § 2259(b)(2) 
does refer to 18 U.S.C. § 3664 as guidance in the issuance and enforcement of 
a restitution order under § 2259.  18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) states that 
                                                                                                                 
(“[I]in an indivisible injury case, the factfinder is to compute the total damage sustained by the 
plaintiff and the percentage of fault of each tortfeasor.  Multiplying the first figure by the second 
gives the maximum recoverable against each tortfeasor.  This result conforms not only with the 
intent of the legislature and the text of the statute but also with common sense.”). 
 84. In re Amy, 636 F.3d 190, 201 (5th Cir. 2011).  However, in United States v. Monzel, 
641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the court found joint and several liability did not apply 
because the court found that 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) did not apply to single defendant 
prosecutions, citing United States v. McGlown, 380 F. App’x. 487, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2010) 
and United States v. Channita, 9 F. App’x. 274, 274-75 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 85. The injury suffered by the victim is similar to Driver B hitting and causing injury to 
X’s car while X was on his way to the auto body shop to fix his car after Driver A had hit and 
caused injury to X’s car the day before.  Unless Driver B can prove he should only be liable 
for the front headlight damage and not the damage done to the back fender caused by Driver 
A, Drivers A and B will be held jointly liable for X’s damages and are both responsible for 
100% of the total damages.  See DIAMOND, supra note 81, at 201-03. 
 86. United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 615 (W.D. Pa. 2010).  
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[i]f the court finds that more than one defendant has contributed to 
the loss of a victim, they may make each defendant liable for 
payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability 
among the defendants to reflect the level of contribution to the 
victim’s loss and economic circumstances of each defendant.87 
Under tort law, once the plaintiff’s injury is determined to be indivisible, and 
the court has determined which defendants constituted a substantial factor in 
causing the indivisible injury to the plaintiff,88 the defendants are held jointly 
liable, and the plaintiff can collect the full amount of damages from any one of 
or combination of the defendants.89  The defendant who pays the plaintiff the 
full amount of damages may seek contribution from the other defendants at a 
later date.90  Hopefully, during the civil trial, evidence is presented so that the 
jury may apportion fault among the defendants and so that the defendant who 
pays the plaintiff will be able to seek an equitable contribution from the 
remaining defendants based upon each defendant’s amount of fault. 
2. Conclusions 
The restitution process during any criminal proceeding should focus on 
making the victim whole to the greatest degree possible while also being 
fair to the defendant.  The judge should first decide whether the defendant 
was a substantial factor in causing the indivisible injury to the victim.  If so, 
the judge should determine the full amount of losses and apportion fault.  
The defendant should then have the right to seek contribution from other 
defendants (or alternatively, the victim is awarded only the defendant’s 
apportioned damages and the victim must seek contribution from other 
defendants).  In this respect, the innocent party is “made whole” by being 
awarded full restitution, but the actual burden of recovering the full 
restitution amount may be the responsibility of either the victim or the 
defendant.  It is within the purview of the court to decide who should bear 
the burden of seeking contribution from other defendants who are later 
determined to be the producers, distributors, or possessors of the victim’s 
images.  It is important that either the victim or defendant has the ability to 
seek contribution from other defendants because, in practical terms, the 
                                                                                                                 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) (2006). 
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). 
 89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § A18 (2000). 
 90. Id. 
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defendant will be serving a very long prison term, and whatever assets he 
had will have been used in defending himself or taken by the government.91   
Therefore, not only should the defendant be held jointly liable, but severally 
liable as well.  The judge should apportion damages based on the defendant’s 
specific share of liability.  Child pornography producers may be more culpable 
or just as culpable as a possessor depending upon the view of the judge.  
Despite the fact that judges may disagree as to the exact apportionment of 
damages in relation to the defendant in their particular courtroom, the idea of 
apportionment would alleviate some of the unfairness inherent in holding the 
defendant responsible for the full amount of damages.  The percentage 
apportioned to the defendant will serve a much greater purpose when the 
defendant attempts to collect the entire amount of damages from the other 
defendants (minus what his apportionment was deemed to be if permitted to 
seek contribution).92  In a civil case, the jury apportions fault amongst all the 
defendants and non-parties whether they are before the court at that time or 
not.  In this context, apportionment among all the defendants (and non-parties 
not yet prosecuted) in one criminal case in one jurisdiction is not possible 
considering multiple defendants in multiple jurisdictions contributed to the 
victim’s indivisible injury.  Some opponents of apportionment have made this 
argument.93  However, it bears mentioning that apportionment in most 
jurisdictions only applies to the defendant’s ability to collect from other co-
defendants and does not affect the victim’s collection of the full amount of 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Part III argues that victims should be the party to seek contribution from past, 
present, and future co-defendants because it is unrealistic to imagine defendants in any 
numbers will be able to collect from other defendants. 
 92. Defendants in § 2259 restitution cases have argued that it would be virtually impossible to 
track loss determinations and restitution obligations in § 2259 cases in other jurisdictions.  If CEOS 
tracks these types of cases, this information could be sent to defendants regarding future cases 
related to the victim.  The defendant would then only need to worry about receiving contribution 
from other defendants after the defendant has paid his/her full apportionment of fault. 
 93. “The viewing of child pornography is often a solitary event,” and therefore, since most 
child pornography cases involve a single defendant in a single case, apportionment should not 
apply.  Brief of National Crime Victim Law Institute (NCVI), The National Center for Victims 
of Crimes, and the Victim’s Rights Law Center in Support of Restitution for Amy and Other 
Victims of Child Pornography at 18, United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 
2009) (No. 6:08-CR-61). “It is impossible to make a proportionate division of the restitution 
amount among an unknown number of unidentified future defendants that have and will 
contribute to the victim’s loss.”  Id. at 20.  The NCVI believes that apportionment among the 
multiple defendants is authorized when the defendants are currently before the court for 
sentencing.  Id. at 21. 
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damages from the defendant.94  Therefore, the fact that not all the defendants 
will be apportioned their amount of liability in one criminal case should not be 
a reason to eliminate the requirement of apportionment altogether.  Joint 
liability protects the victim; the apportionment of fault protects the defendant 
in a later contribution claim.95 
D. What Evidence Is Needed to Support a Restitution Claim for Damages? 
1. Evidence Issue at Restitution Hearings  
In many of the § 2259 criminal restitution cases, courts have permitted 
victims to allege their losses in the form of affidavits sent to the court, 
prosecution, and defense.  In some § 2259 cases, restitution is decided upon 
the affidavits submitted while in others a hearing is held in which the expert 
witnesses must testify as to their claims.96 
These affidavits have generally included (1) a victim impact statement,97 
(2) a psychological evaluation in which the psychologist or psychiatrist 
explains that the victim suffers from various medical problems (including 
sleeping issues and post-traumatic stress disorder, experiences fear, anger, 
and shame as a result of her exploitation and engages in self-harming 
behavior which requires past, present, and future therapy) and (3) a report 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Defendants have argued that fashioning an order of restitution is so complicated and time-
consuming that it outweighs the need to provide restitution.  18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3) (2006). 
 95. This applies if the defendant is required to seek contribution and not the victim.  
Part III argues the victim should seek contribution.   
 96. At a restitution hearing in United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 
2827204, at *1-3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009), three witnesses testified on behalf of the victim:  a 
detective in the case, who received an image of child pornography via the internet from the 
defendant, the victim’s attorney, who outlined the basis for each amount requested, and a 
psychologist with a Ph.D. in general child psychology, child sexual abuse, and traumatic stress 
in children, who testified that the dissemination and possession of these images depicting the 
sexual abuse caused additional harm to the victim and resulted in harm distinct from that 
suffered from her actual physical sexual abuse.  The government also entered into evidence 
several exhibits to support the victim’s loss calculations such as tables that broke down the 
present value of net wage and benefit loss and another table which analyzed the present value of 
future treatment and counseling costs to create a total of $3,680,153 in damages.  Id. 
 97. Victim impact statements describe victims' financial, physical, psychological, or 
emotional damages; harm to relationships; medical treatments or mental health services; the 
need for restitution; and, in some cases, victims' opinions of appropriate sentences.  FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B).  They are used in court to ensure that victims' voices are heard during 
the criminal justice process.  SART Toolkit, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Jul. 28, 2011), 
http://ovc.ncjrs.gov/sartkit/develop/issues-vis.html. 
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by an economist discussing the value of lost wages and benefits and the 
reduction of the value of the victim’s life due to this exploitation.98   
Some defendants have argued that § 2259(b)(3), which states that the 
“’full amount of the victim’s losses’ includes any costs incurred by the 
victim,” only applies to the victim’s past and present losses and not future 
losses, such as the cost of future medical treatment and counseling.  
Defense counsel may have a point—the clear language of § 2259 uses the 
past tense in describing what losses are covered.  Future losses could be 
inferred as not included under § 2259 since the statute does not discuss 
typical future loss requirements such as fixing a loss period99 or reducing 
future losses to present value.100   
Yet most courts, by awarding amounts that include future losses, have 
apparently found that the words “costs incurred by the victim” does not limit 
the victim’s damages to past losses but rather, have found “incurred” to be an 
adjectival participle with no connotation of tense.101  This would seem to be in 
                                                                                                                 
 98. For example, in United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2009), 
Amy submitted a victim impact statement, a psychological evaluation by a forensic 
psychologist, and an economic report.  The paperwork also included attorney’s fees and expert 
witness fees so that the total losses alleged was $3,367,854.  Id.  A breakdown of this figure 
includes $2,855,173 for lost wages and earning capacity, $512,618 for future treatment and 
counseling costs, $16,980 in expert fees, and an unknown amount for attorney’s fees and other 
costs.  United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191 n.7 (D. Me. 2009).  
 In Berk, Vicky submitted a forensic psychological evaluation completed by Dr. Randall 
Green, a victim impact statement as well as a statement by her mother and stepfather, and “a 
transcript of an internet chat that discusses ‘Vicky’ and her images.”  Id.  Vicky alleged 
“$128,005 for future counseling expenses, . . . $19,497.91 for expenses, and . . . $3,500 in 
attorney’s fees for a total of $151,002.91.”  Id.  
 99. In tort law, “[w]hen the plaintiff claims that she will suffer losses in the future, she 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that those losses will in fact be incurred in 
the future.  She must also prove duration.  If she will endure pain for the rest of her life, the 
trier must have some basis for estimating her life expectancy.  If her injury is permanent and 
will never allow her to work, the trier must have some basis for estimating how long the 
plaintiff would have worked if she had not been injured.  Such periods may be very long, 
easily thirty or forty years in some cases.”  DOBBS, supra note 55, at 1056-57.  In child 
pornography cases, rarely has a victim been asked to provide more than an affidavit from a 
statistician to prove life expectancy and work estimates had she/he not been injured and an 
affidavit from a psychiatrist or a psychologist to determine future medical and therapy needs. 
 100. In tort law, “[c]ourts have said that damages awarded for losses that will occur in 
the future should be reduced to present value.”  Id. at 1057. 
 101. The damages award may encompass future losses if estimated with reasonable 
certainty.  United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04-CR-340, 2009 WL 1886055 at *2-3 (2d Cir. 
July 2, 2009); United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
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line with congressional intent given that the victims will be young children, 
and many of the losses, such as lost wages, will not fully manifest until 
adulthood.  If criminal restitution damage calculations were to mimic tort law 
damage calculations, the victim’s future need for medical care and associated 
costs as well as the victim’s future lost wages would almost always be 
recoverable as they are in civil suits (as long as sufficiently proved). 
While hearsay is permissible during a sentencing hearing, the information 
presented to the court must contain a “sufficient indicia of reliability.”102  
However, hearsay presented at most sentencing hearings consists of information 
intended to persuade a judge to sentence a defendant to a lower or higher 
sentence depending upon which party is introducing the evidence.  The stakes in 
restitution cases are as high or even higher than sentencing considerations 
because the judge has to make a total loss calculation similar to the one made by 
juries in civil courts.  Those juries receive a wealth of information and testimony 
prior to making a final damage determination.  Plaintiffs in civil suits are 
required to spend a significant portion of the trial proving specific damages, 
property damages, personal injury damages (including medical expenses, lost 
wages or diminished earning capacity, a reduction to “present value,” and pain 
and suffering), and punitive damages, by presenting evidence in the form of 
expert and witness testimony.103  This testimony at trial is considered during 
                                                                                                                 
Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1248 
(10th Cir. 2001). 
 102. United States v. Robinson, 898 F.2d 1111, 1115-16 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The district 
court may consider hearsay evidence in determining sentence, but the accused must be given 
an opportunity to refute it, and the evidence must bear some minimal indicia of reliability in 
respect of defendant's right to due process.” (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 
1546, 1555 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d 1412 (5th Cir.1989)). 
 103. While medical expenses may be easy to establish, lost wages and pain and suffering 
may prove to be much more difficult.  In tort, a plaintiff can ask for past and future lost wages or 
diminished earning capacity.  DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 81, at 214.  Past and future wages are 
relatively easy to prove. The plaintiff must show the lost wages or lost business earnings during 
the period impacted by the injury and in the future period the injury is anticipated to impact.  Id.  
Diminished earning capacity “measures the victim’s lost potential to earn income because of the 
injury and is not dependent on proof that the victim had exploited, or would in the future exploit, 
that capacity.”  Id.  In essence, the plaintiff is compensated “for an injury which deprives him of 
his opportunity to use his time as he so chooses.”  Id.  The plaintiff must use the prevailing 
workplace compensation rates and prove his/her specific ability, skills, aptitude for a career path 
prior to the injury, educational attainment, and prior employment history (if it exists) in order to 
receive damages for diminished earning capacity.  Id.  If the plaintiff is awarded a lump sum, the 
damages must be reduced to their “present value” which must reflect “the interest the plaintiff 
can earn on the advance transfer of money for future losses in income.”  Id. at 215.  Since pain 
and suffering damages have no monetary equivalent like lost wages and income, proof of pain 
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jury deliberations when the jury assigns fault (if multiple defendants are 
involved) and awards the total amount of damages owed.  The standards set by 
the criminal courts in proving damages during the restitution phase of 
sentencing should be changed to reflect the standards set by the courts in civil 
trials as they pertain to damage calculations.  Defendants should have the right 
to confront the victim’s expert witnesses who have assigned these loss 
calculation figures at a restitution hearing.104  Defendants should also be given 
the opportunity to provide their own experts, such as an economist, vocational 
expert, or psychiatrist, to dispute the total amount of damages suffered by the 
victim.105  Arbitrary figures alleged for non-pecuniary losses, such as pain and 
suffering and other variations of mental distress, should be questioned just as 
they are in civil courts.  Similar to bifurcation in criminal trials, in which the 
asset forfeiture phase is put forth after the jury finds the defendant guilty, so too 
                                                                                                                 
and suffering is “highly dependent on proof that the victim is or was during his life conscious of 
his injuries and the negative implications of those injuries.”  Id. at 216. 
 104. In fact, one could argue it may be a violation of the United States Constitution’s Sixth 
Amendment right of Confrontation if they are not given the opportunity to cross examine these 
expert witnesses during a restitution hearing.  But see United States v. Young, 981 F.2d 180, 187 
(5th Cir. 1993) (“At sentencing, due process merely requires that information relied on in 
determining an appropriate sentence have ‘some minimal indicia of reliability.’” (quoting United 
States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 784 (5th Cir. 1991))).  If restitution is considered a criminal 
penalty, questions regarding the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial are raised.  The Supreme 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the Fifth Amendment right to due 
process require that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a 
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury 
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490 (2000).  Judges must determine that “restitution does not constitute a criminal sanction” 
or that the “restitution statutes fail to set the ‘statutory maximum’ necessary to trigger Apprendi 
concerns” in order to avoid any Sixth Amendment right to jury trial violation.  CHARLES DOYLE, 
CONG. RESEARCH. SERV. RL 34138, RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 5-6 (2007). 
 105. Defendants may be able to argue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the 
Sixth Amendment if defense counsel is unable or unwilling to provide the defendant with the 
opportunity to have his own economist or psychiatrist/psychologist review the victim’s loss 
calculations prior to being ordered to pay millions of dollars to the victim.  A defendant’s request 
for expert funds was denied without prejudice in United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 
784 n.5 (E.D. Tex. 2009).  Defense attorneys often receive the victim’s claims shortly before the 
hearing and are ill-prepared to address restitution concerns.  In a perfect world, the probation 
officer, who is required to prepare a report identifying each victim of the offense and the extent 
of their injuries, damages, or losses, receives information from the government no “later than 60 
days prior to the date initially set for sentencing.”  18 U.S.C. 3664(d)(1) (2006).  However, if the 
government is unable to consult with all identified victims during this sixty-day period and the 
victims submit their affidavits outside the sixty-day period, defense counsel likely will not have 
the time to investigate loss amounts and find their own expert witnesses in time for sentencing. 
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should the restitution portion of the trial begin after the defendant’s guilt is 
determined.  Civil courts often bifurcate the trials, requiring  the jury to 
determine whether the plaintiff has established causation before the plaintiff is 
able to present evidence on actual damages. 
As the law currently stands, “[a]ny dispute as to the property amount or 
type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of 
the evidence standard.”106  The government must bear the burden of proof 
with respect to loss amount, the defense must bear the burden of proof with 
respect to the ability to pay, and the court must assign the burdens with 
respect to other disputed matters as it deems appropriate.107  Even though 
the defendant bears the burden with respect to his ability to pay, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3664(f)(1)(A) is clear that the court should order full restitution without 
regard to the financial circumstances of the defendant.108  Initially, this 
requirement would seem unfair to the defendant who may be unable to pay 
a victim millions of dollars—however, the focus of restitution is on making 
the victim “whole.”109  If the defendant is ordered to pay the victim’s full 
amount of damages, it is in the defendant’s best interest to request that the 
judge assign fault so that the defendant may later seek contribution from 
other defendants (past, present, and future) in order to be fully 
compensated.  Title 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) also requires that the court not 
take into account the fact that a victim may have been compensated by 
                                                                                                                 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).   
 107. Id.  The government bears the burden of proving: (1) that a person or entity is a 
victim for purposes of restitution and (2) the amount of loss.  United States v. Waknine, 543 
F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 108. United States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted); United States v. 
Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 460 (6th Cir. 2005).  The statute most likely requires the defendant 
to prove his or her ability to pay so that the court can consider the defendant’s assets, 
anticipated future income, and other financial obligations in its calculation of the manner and 
schedule of restitution payment for each victim.  18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2).  For example, in 
Staples, the court ordered that 
[u]pon release from incarceration, the defendant shall pay restitution at the rate 
of 10% of monthly gross earnings, until such time as the court may alter that 
payment schedule.  These payments do not preclude the government from using 
other assets or income of the defendant to satisfy his restitution obligation. 
United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 
2009). Compensation may be made in lump sum payments, partial payments, in-kind 
payments (such as replacements costs), or nominal periodic payments.  18 U.S.C. § 
3664(f)(3)(A), (B). 
 109. United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204 at *4. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
684 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:653 
 
 
insurance “or any other source.”110  In torts, this collateral source rule is 
somewhat controversial.111  Placing a collateral source rule in the criminal 
restitution context is rather harsh—if the victim receives compensation 
from other possessors of her images or from other distributors or the actual 
producer of the images, the victim’s award against the defendant in the 
particular case should be trimmed by the amount of these collateral 
payments.  Reduction of damages to the particular defendant will not create 
a “systematic underdeterrence” for possessors of child pornography, which 
is the underlying reason behind the collateral source rule.112 
2. Conclusions 
Courts must ensure that these damage figures are fully supported by the 
record.  Some of the practical difficulties include:  whether the defendant 
should be permitted to take the deposition of the victim to see what she says 
about “losses;” whether the defendant should be permitted to require the 
victim to submit to an examination by experts of the defendant’s choosing; 
whether the defendant should be permitted to interview the victim, perhaps 
by telephone, regarding losses; whether the defendant should be permitted 
to learn the location and true identity of the victim; whether the defendant 
should be able to hire CPAs, financial experts, psychologists, psychiatrists, 
and vocational experts at the government’s expense in order to challenge 
the victim’s affidavit and present affirmative proof on behalf of the 
offender; and whether the defendant should be able to challenge the 
“reasonableness” of any of the listed losses in § 2259.   
Courts should hold restitution hearings separately from the guilt or 
sentencing phase of the case.  Defense attorneys would have enough time to 
counter the victim’s loss calculations (if they need time to review the 
victim’s calculations) and to rebut the victim’s evidence with expert 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B).  However, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2) states that 
[a]ny amount paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be reduced by 
any amount later recovered as compensatory damages for the same loss by the 
victim in – (A) any Federal civil proceeding; and (B) any State civil 
proceeding, to the extent provided by the law of the State. 
Id. § 3664(j)(2). 
 111. “Numerous reform statutes . . . reject the collateral source rule and allow the jury to 
consider such insurance payouts and deduct them from the defendant’s liability.”  See 
DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 81, at 223.  Some reform statutes, such as section 4545(c) of the 
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, allow collateral source admissibility without 
indicating what role such evidence should play in the jury’s deliberations.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 
4545(c) (McKinney 2009). 
 112. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 450 (1999). 
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witnesses of their own.  Yet, a defendant’s need to rebut a victim’s 
assertions must be balanced with the need for judicial efficiency.  A 
bifurcated sentencing hearing split into a sentencing and restitution phase 
cannot be far apart.  Judges are under considerable time pressure to 
conclude these matters in one short hearing and are required to announce 
the restitution order from the bench at the end of the hearing and then later 
enter a Judgment and Commitment Order that includes the restitution order.  
If the defendant went to trial, judges should consider allowing juries to 
determine damages in the criminal restitution context (after the defendant is 
found guilty at trial), just as juries are held to be competent to determine 
damages in civil suits or asset forfeiture decisions in criminal trials.  These 
options might answer many of the practical difficulties listed above, but 
would also devote a larger, more burdensome amount of time and expense 
on the government and the court system and subject the victim to greater 
scrutiny.   
E. What Are the Due Process Concerns When Imposing a § 2259 
Restitution Order? 
1. Due Process Issues Identified 
Several defendants in § 2259 restitution cases have argued that the 
amount of restitution imposed violated the Eighth Amendment’s excessive 
fines clause and also violated their due process rights as they had not been 
made aware that they may be subject to restitution at the time they pled 
guilty.113 
The second argument is much easier to resolve than the first.  The 
Supreme Court has stated that a defendant must be “aware of the 
consequences of his plea.”114  But a variance from the specified Rule 11 
procedures constitutes harmless error if it does not affect the defendant’s 
substantial rights.115  If the court’s failure to advise the defendant of the 
                                                                                                                 
 113. United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2010); United States v. 
Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 n.5 (D. Me. 2009); United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-
CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050 at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009); United States v. Wilk, 
No. 04-60216-CR, 2007 WL 2263942, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2007) (arguing that the 
forfeiture of the defendant’s house, after finding it to have been used to commit or promote 
the possession of child pornography, was excessive and grossly disproportionate to the 
offense of child pornography possession).  
 114. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464 (1969). 
 115. United States v. Rogers, 984 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding to district 
court to decide whether the interests of justice would be better served by resentencing 
without restitution or by offering the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea). 
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possibility of restitution at the time of the plea colloquy was deemed to 
affect the defendant’s “substantial rights,” and was not, in fact, a simple 
variance, the court can still cure any defect from the Rule 11 plea colloquy 
by informing the defendant of the court’s restitution authority and offering 
the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea and go to trial.116   
As to the first argument set forth by the defendant, the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of “excessive fines”117 and “limits the 
government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as 
punishment for some offense.’”118  The question becomes whether the fine 
is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”119  
Courts must evaluate the statutory maximum fine, the defendant’s level of 
culpability, and the actual harm caused by the defendant’s conduct in 
determining whether the fine bears some relationship to the offense.120 
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dubose121 found that restitution 
ordered pursuant to the MVRA, under 18 U.S.C. § 3664, did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment because it was “geared directly to the amount of the 
victim’s loss caused by the defendant’s illegal activity.”122  Again, 
proximate cause rears its head in the Eighth Amendment context.  While 
defendants may argue that the victim’s recoverable losses should be limited 
to those proximately caused by the offense of conviction (that is, limited to 
the mere possession of the victim’s images in the particular case at issue or 
else the award may face Eighth Amendment excessive fine concerns), the 
total injury to the victim is indivisible and, therefore, it is practically 
impossible to make an individualized inquiry into the amount of losses 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A, possession, distribution, and receipt of child 
pornography, the court is authorized to order restitution in an amount up to the statutory 
maximum fine of $250,000 under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571(b)(3) or the maximum guideline fine, 
which is $250,000 at U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3). 
 117. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 118. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998) (internal quotes omitted).   
 119. Id. at 334, 337.   
 120. Id. at 338-40.  As previously described, the statutory penalties for possession of an 
image of child pornography in violation of section 2252A(a)(5)(B) include imprisonment for 
not more than ten years for a first offense, a fine of $250,000, or both, and not more than 
three years of supervised release.  The advisory sentencing guidelines group counts of 
possession of child pornography and aggregate images to generate an offense level and 
sentencing range.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2G2.2(b)(7), 3D1.2(d) 
(2011).  Restitution may be disproportionate when viewed in relation to the applicable 
statutory penalties and advisory sentencing guidelines’ range. 
 121. 146 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 122. Id. at 1144; see also United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir. 2003).  
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proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.  The best workable solution 
is for the judge to apportion fault (albeit somewhat arbitrarily)123 so that the 
defendant (or victim) might later seek contribution from other 
defendants.124 
2. Conclusions 
A § 2259 restitution order issued to a possessor of child pornography, 
which takes into account the victim’s entire loss can become so large and 
overwhelming for the defendant that the damages awarded begin to look 
less like compensatory damages, which are meant as restitution for harm 
sustained by the victim,125 and more like a criminal fine or punitive 
damages designed to punish and deter particularly egregious conduct.126  
Extremely large restitution amounts may make it difficult for possessors to 
later assimilate into society and have any chance at rehabilitation since they 
are now burdened with exorbitant restitution claims which may defy the 
defendant’s ability to pay.  And despite the fact that the United States 
abolished federal imprisonment for unpaid debts in 1833, debtor’s prison 
could become a reality.127  Restitution amounts cannot be discharged in 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See infra Part III. 
 124. Although, under §§ 3663 and 3664, restitution, by definition, demands that it be 
exactly proportionate to the harm caused by the offense.  See United States v. Beydoun, 469 
F.3d 102, 107 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Dawson, 250 
F.3d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903. 
 126. Id. § 908.  “Courts in most states award punitive damages against defendants who 
act with malice.”  DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 81, at 218.  Have the possessors of child 
pornography acted with malice or at least shown a reckless disregard towards a victim’s 
rights to justify punitive damages?   
 127. Editorial, Timeline: A Brief History of Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, 
http://select.nytimes.com/2005/11/16/opinion/15talking.timeline.html?_r=1. Imprisoning 
individuals for unpaid debts was common during both ancient Greek and Roman rule and in 
the Middle Ages.  Id.  American Revolutionary war hero and father of Robert E. Lee, Henry 
“Lighthorse Harry” Lee III, was imprisoned for unpaid debts between 1808 and 1809.  
Henry “Light-Horse Harry” Lee, THE ROBINSON LIBR., http://www.robinsonlibrary.com/ 
america/unitedstates/1775/biography/lee-h.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2011).  With the rise 
in borrowers who are behind in paying off their credit card bills, auto loans, mortgage 
payments, and other bills, arrest warrants are now being issued “if a borrower defies a court 
order to repay a debt or doesn’t show up in court.”  Jessica Silver Greenberg, Welcome to 
Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704396504576204553811636610.html.  “Retailers, credit-card issuers, 
landlords and debt collectors are the most frequent seekers of such orders, according to court 
filings and interviews with judges and lawyers.”  Id. 
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bankruptcy.128  Any criminal monetary penalties ordered at sentencing must 
be paid and enforced immediately unless otherwise ordered by the judge.129  
It is entirely possible that if the defendant does not fully pay restitution, the 
defendant may be held in contempt of court and sentenced to additional 
time for not complying with the court’s order.130  The United States may 
also file liens on the defendant’s properties, and have rights to all of the 
defendant’s properties and assets.131 
The goal of restitution should be to find a balance between the desire to 
make the victim “whole” and the desire to provide the defendant with a 
chance at rehabilitation in the future.132  With the ability to seek 
contribution, a defendant may be able to recover some of his losses from 
other possessors, distributors, and producers.  However, this may become 
much more complicated as more and more victims begin to make their own 
restitution claims, and defendants have scarce funds to go after co-
                                                                                                                 
 128. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2010); United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469, 473-74 (5th Cir. 
1995) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986)). 
 129. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 120, § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1(c). 
 130. Ahern v. Ahern, 15 S.W.3d 73, 79 (Tenn. 2000) (“After a finding of contempt, 
courts have several remedies available depending upon the facts of the case. A court can 
imprison an individual to compel performance of a court order. This is typically referred to 
as ‘civil contempt.’ This remedy is available only when the individual has the ability to 
comply with the order at the time of the contempt hearing. Thus, with civil contempt, the 
one in contempt has the ‘keys to the jail’ and can purge the contempt by complying with the 
court's order. In civil contempt, the imprisonment is meted out for the benefit of a party 
litigant. A court can also imprison and/or fine an individual simply as punishment for the 
contempt. This remedy is commonly referred to as ‘criminal contempt.’ Unless otherwise 
provided, the circuit, chancery, and appellate courts are limited to imposing a fine of $50.00 
and to imprisoning an individual for not more than ten days. A party who is in criminal 
contempt cannot be freed by eventual compliance.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 131. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(C) (2011). 
 132. In the civil context, 
[t]he rules of tort law are intended to achieve some uneasy balance between 
justice and efficiency. . . . From the vantage of corrective justice, damage 
awards function as a form of redress.  Set the damages too low and P is not 
made whole even if liability is established; set them too high and D is forced to 
pay for losses he did not cause.  The central legal task is first to choose and 
then to apply a legal rule that avoids these twin perils. . . . Set that award too 
low and D will consume too many of P’s resources for his own benefit.  Set 
that award too high and D will spend too many resources to avoid harms to 
others.  Making accurate damage calculations is critical under both negligence 
and strict liability regimes in order to make D’s private costs align with the 
social costs of his actions. 
EPSTEIN, supra note 112, at 435-36. 
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defendants.133  Defendants will face not only a claim from one or two 
victims but possibly claims from multiple victims seeking hundreds of 
thousands or millions of dollars each.  The task of seeking “contribution” 
by one possessor against another, by one defendant against another, may 
become overwhelming and seemingly unworkable. 
III. Proposed Solution: Apportioning Fault in Child Pornography 
Possession Cases 
The various arguments facing judges regarding the matters discussed 
above are all issues which need to be identified and addressed when 
apportioning fault in child pornography possession cases.  If the injury to 
the victim is indivisible, just as in tort law, the defendant is jointly and 
severally liable for the full amount of damages.  Each defendant has 
contributed to the single result—the victim’s fear, shame, and humiliation 
in the face of sexual abuse and repeated victimization each time the image 
is viewed.  Joint and several liability protects the victim from being 
undercompensated.  However, in order to avoid unfair treatment of a 
defendant who is the mere possessor of child pornography images, a judge 
should take into consideration the totality of damages done to the victim 
along with the number of identified and unidentified offenders, and 
apportion fault based on a reasonable assumption of individual culpability.   
Apportionment will prove to be difficult in these cases—usually one 
defendant convicted of child pornography possession out of hundreds is 
before that particular judge.  How can a judge apportion fault when there 
are future defendants who have not yet viewed the victim’s images, or 
defendants who will never be identified or prosecuted?  Thus, the fault 
percentages based on the number of prospective defenders will randomly 
change as future offenders are identified.  In the context of illegal drug 
                                                                                                                 
 133. According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), 
the “volume of apparent child pornography images seized by law enforcement and sent to 
NCMEC for review continues to grow dramatically . . . [yet] the number of child victims 
who are identified remains relatively small.”  Brief of NCMEC at 4-5, United States v. 
Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex., 2009) (No. 6:08-CR-61).  “Of these identified 
children, 89% are located in the United States and 11% are located outside the United States.  
Id. at 5.  However, since the victims have only recently begun seeking restitution from 
possessors of child pornography and have begun to receive significantly high damage 
awards, it is reasonable to assume the amount of victims requesting restitution will rise.  
These high damage awards also encourage attorneys to seek out victims of child 
pornography in order to find deep-pocket defendants who may be able to pay the full amount 
of damages (including attorney’s fees). 
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prosecutions, the fault percentages can be quantified and tallied quite easily.  
If an innocent child happens upon some toxic cocaine being sold by a street 
dealer in Minnesota, and the child ingests it, and is permanently harmed by 
it,134 the fault could be apportioned amongst the manufacturer at the cocaine 
lab, the Colombian trafficker who purchased it and sold it in Mexico, the 
Mexican trafficker who purchased it and transported it to Denver, 
Colorado,135 the distributor in Colorado who transported it to Minnesota, 
and the dealer who divided up the cocaine and sold it in small quantities on 
the street.  If each individual’s fault was determined based upon the profits 
they made in the selling of the illegal drugs (and for simplicity’s sake, the 
profits were based on the purchase of one kilogram of cocaine), the 
percentages would be as follows: the manufacturer at the lab would be 
liable for 0.5%, the Colombian trafficker 2%, the Mexican trafficker 47.5%, 
the Denver distributor 25%, and the Minnesota street dealer 25%.136  
Therefore, if the child victim’s total medical expenses, therapy, lost income, 
etc. totals one million dollars—each defendant is liable for the one million 
but may seek contribution from the other defendants not before the court.  
Not only do these percentages take into account the amount of profits each 
individual earned on the drug deal, but the amount of profit (and 
percentage) correlated to the amount of risk each individual assumed in 
transporting the illegal substance to its final destination.  If the street dealer 
sells to ten end-users, he assumes great risk and receives a larger amount of 
profit because it is likely those ten individuals, if eventually caught by law 
enforcement with the drugs, may incriminate the dealer in Minnesota.  The 
Mexican trafficker also assumes a greater risk of getting caught crossing the 
Mexico-United States border with cocaine than the Colombian trafficker 
                                                                                                                 
 134. To make this example as similar as possible to § 2259, the victim must be innocent.  
An end-user, drug addict, may be held partially liable for creating demand for the drug in the 
first place.  This scenario could be just as effective if an innocent child in Minnesota was 
killed in a drug-related gun battle between two rival gangs. 
 135. Denver, Colorado is considered a known drug source city in the United States.  See 
Colorado Drug Threat Assessment, NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., http://www.justice. 
gov/ndic/pubs4/4300/cocaine.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). 
 136. The percentages of fault are based upon illegal cocaine prices commonly known by 
Drug Enforcement Administration agents.  See generally MATTHEW B. ROBINSON & RENEE 
G. SCHERLEN, LIES, DAMNED LIES, AND DRUG WAR STATISTICS 107 (2007).  Generally, one 
kilogram of cocaine sells for $1000 in Colombia, $5000 in Mexico next to the U.S. border, 
$20,000 in Denver, $30,000 in Minnesota, and $40,000 on the street in Minnesota if the 
street dealer sells ten packets of 100 grams each for $4000 each.  Id. 
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who needs only to send the cocaine to Mexico where there is little law 
enforcement presence compared to the United States.137 
Profits associated with child pornography images are much more 
difficult to determine.  It is common knowledge that several internet sites 
exist in which users barter and trade one image for another rather than pay 
for the images, thereby creating an even greater demand for new images to 
replenish the supply so that the users can keep trading.138  If fault is to be 
apportioned, it seems fair to suggest that producers are the most culpable 
and should shoulder at least 50% of the liability, with distributors and 
redistributors a close second at 25%, and possessors, the least culpable 
between 25% to 1% (depending upon the amount of images found in his 
possession).139  Within the categories, those who possess thousands of 
images should also be apportioned more of the fault as opposed to those 
who possess only a few images. 
Since the images can be reproduced indefinitely, the scenario is similar to 
lawsuits in which music producers under the Recording Industry Association 
of America (RIAA) sued companies such as LimeWire for copyright 
infringement.  Websites encouraged users to share their music files on 
LimeWire, which took profits away from musicians, record labels, and 
producers associated with RIAA.140  If the court apportioned fault, end users 
of the website would be responsible for a small percentage of the total amount 
of damages to RIAA whereas LimeWire, the storer and distributor of the 
songs, would be responsible for a greater amount of the damages.  The task of 
apportioning fault for a victim’s total loss for injuries suffered from child 
pornography among all offenders may be difficult and arbitrary.  It may 
appear arbitrary to assign 50% of the fault to the producer, 25% to distributors, 
and 25-1% to each possessor, but at least a defendant would then have the 
ability to recover some of the losses paid to the victim if the judge issued a full 
restitution order against the only defendant charged and prosecuted in court.141 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See Randal C. Archibold, Bit by Bit, a Mexican Police Force Is Eradicated, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/world/americas/12mexico.html. 
 138. See MONIQUE MATTEI FERRARO, EOGHAN CASEY & MICHAEL MCGRATH, 
INVESTIGATING CHILD EXPLOITATION AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE INTERNET, THE LAW AND 
FORENSIC SCIENCE 73 (2005): Troy Stabenow, A Method for Case Study: A Proposal for 
Reforming the Child Pornography Guidelines, 24 FED. SENT. R. 108, 116 (2011). 
 139. These apportionments are simply for the sake of argument and could easily be 
adjusted up or down in a given case. 
 140. Thomas Mennecke, LimeWire Sued by the RIAA, SLYCK, Aug. 4, 2006, http://www. 
slyck.com/story1258_LimeWire_Sued_by_the_RIAA. 
 141. The obvious difference between these examples and the possessory child 
pornography cases is the focus on profits lost compared to losses suffered by the victim.  
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Some courts have devised their own apportionment formulas by dividing 
defendants into categories, assigning a percentage of damages to each 
category,142 and creating a formula for determining restitution amounts by 
utilizing the civil remedies section which Congress made available to 
victims of § 2252 violations.143  Section 2255 states that a victim of sexual 
exploitation “shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than 
$150,000 in value.”144  Courts have set 2% of $150,000 as the amount of 
harm caused by a possessor of child pornography, and have determined that 
                                                                                                                 
However, as previously discussed, personal losses suffered in most crimes (such as in a gang 
rape or kidnapping situation with multiple defendants) are easy to determine since most of 
the co-defendants are finite and identified.  In the drug and copyright examples, the co-
defendants are much more difficult to identify and therefore, similar to these child 
pornography cases in that particular instance. 
 142. United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1266 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Aguirre II, No. 1:08-CR-434 AWI, 2010 WL 1328819, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010); 
United States v. Scheidt, No. 1:07-CR-00293 AWI, 2010 WL 144837, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 
11, 2010); United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. 
Ferenci, No. 1:08-CR-0414 AWI, 2009 WL 2579102, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); 
United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270 AWI, 2009 WL 2579103, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 19, 2009); United States v. Zane, No. 1:08-CR-0369 AWI, 2009 WL 2567832, at *4-5 
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); United States v. Monk, No. 1:08-CR-0365 AWI, 2009 WL 
2567831, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009).  Defendants have been divided among those who 
produced and/or transmitted the images, those who possessed images, and those who 
possessed and transmitted images. 
 143. See United States v. Lindauer, No. 3:10-cr-00023, 2011 WL 1225992, at *4 (W.D. 
Va. Mar. 30, 2011); United States v. Stowers, No. CR-10-74-JHP, 2011 WL 3022188, at *4 
n.15 (E.D. Okla. Jul. 22, 2011); United States v. Brannon, No. 2:09cr19, 2011 WL 251168, 
at *3 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 26, 2011); United States v. Mather, No. 1:09-CR-00412 AWI, 2010 
WL 5173029, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010); Aguirre II, 2010 WL 1328819 at *4; United 
States v. Brunner, No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010); Scheidt, 
2010 WL 144837 at *5; United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App’x. 377, 379 (9th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *6 n.10 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 
2009); Renga, 2009 WL 2579103 at *5; Monk, 2009 WL 2567831 at *4-5; Zane, 2009 WL 
2567832 at *5.  Title 18 U.S.C. § 2255 states that 
[a]ny person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 
2242 [sexual abuse], 2243 [sexual abuse], 2251, 2251A [selling children for 
purposes of sexually explicit conduct], 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 
2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation, 
regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor, may 
sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual 
damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee.  Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be 
deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value. 
18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). 
 144. 18 U.S.C. § 2255.  
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$3000 was found to be a reasonable apportionment of liability pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3664(h) and 2259.145  Courts reason that Congress was aware 
that victims would have a difficult time proving the exact amount of 
damages a particular possessor or distributor caused, and therefore, 
Congress set forth $150,000 as the minimum amount the victim suffered.146  
The civil remedy in § 2255 is separate from criminal restitution, yet 
“[c]rimes and torts frequently overlap. . . .  The [Mandatory Victims 
Restitution] Act enables the tort victim to recover his damages in a 
summary proceeding ancillary to a criminal prosecution.”147  While the civil 
remedy statute may be of some use to judges in determining the victim’s 
damage, setting the damages at $150,000 is much more arbitrary than 
determining the victim’s full amount of losses and apportioning the 
defendant’s fault and proportionate share of liability.  
Lastly, if victims are allowed to file the same restitution claims in 
various federal jurisdictions throughout the United States, this creates the 
possibility of dual recovery.  How is it possible or justifiable for a victims’ 
attorney to claim the same amount of attorney fees, medical expenses, lost 
incomes, in multiple jurisdictions for the same offense, the same type of 
possession case?  In a civil proceeding, once a jury determines damages, the 
plaintiff may then recover from the defendants in the case.  While those 
same defendants may not be the only individuals who caused the harm, it is 
well settled that the plaintiff may not sue for the identical damages in a 
separate case.  The original defendants and non-parties not before the court 
but identified in the civil trial are responsible for the plaintiff’s damages 
and these defendants can seek contribution from those parties complicit in 
the offense.  Thus, the plaintiff presents her evidence of damages to the 
court only once and can recover only once.  Similarly, in the criminal 
restitution context, the victim/petitioner should only present her evidence of 
                                                                                                                 
 145. This amount is two percent of the $150,000 amount reflected in Section 2255.  
Given the high amount of the deemed damages in Section 2255, the court finds an amount 
less than $3000 inconsistent with Congress’s findings on the harm to children victims of 
child pornography.  At the same time, the court finds $3000 is a level of restitution that the 
court is confident is somewhat less than the actual harm this particular defendant caused 
each victim, resolving any due process concerns.  Monk, 2009 WL 2567831 at *5.  
 146. Id. 
 147. United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. 
Duncan, 870 F.2d 1532, 1539 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding no abuse of discretion in the district 
court’s deferral to judgment in the civil suit in determining the proper amount of restitution 
where the amount of compensatory damages sought in the civil suit, which covered the same 
acts of wrongdoing as stated in the criminal restitution order, was no greater than the amount 
alleged by the government in connection with the criminal offense). 
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loss once, and in each subsequent case, the federal district court judge 
should give “full faith and credit”148 to the restitution amount given to the 
victim in the previous federal case.  In this sense, the difficult task of 
determining damages has already been decided, and it is the current judge’s 
sole task to determine how to apportion fault as it pertains to the particular 
defendant before him.  This would prevent dual recovery by the victim and 
limit the wide array of restitution awards from decisions made by multiple 
federal district court judges in different federal jurisdictions. 
Child pornography possession cases are unique.  The victim must 
confront an unknown number of co-defendants, and most defendants lack 
the resources to seek contribution from other future co-defendants.  The 
author proposes that:  (1) the full amount of restitution owed to a particular 
victim should be determined when the victim first requests restitution, and 
the amount should be fixed after the first case is adjudicated; (2) the judge 
in future cases pertaining to the same victim should apportion fault and 
liability to the particular defendant appearing before his court based on the 
earlier total restitution amount as determined by the initial court; (3) the 
judge should issue a restitution order based upon the apportioned liability; 
(4) victims are then permitted to seek the rest of the restitution damages not 
fully recovered during the first criminal case during successive criminal 
trials, until the full amount of damages are satisfied; and (5) once that 
restitution award is satisfied, if the victim feels re-victimized by additional 
viewings that occurs after the original restitution was requested, the victim 
must petition the court and allege additional losses before seeking 
additional award amounts. 
These recommendations appear to place a greater burden on the victim 
(plaintiff) to recover the full amount of restitution from individual defendants, 
whereas in a civil trial the defendant oftentimes is held liable for all losses and 
it is incumbent upon the defendant to seek recovery from other co-
conspirators or offenders.  However, in child pornography possession cases, it 
is the victim that receives information from prosecutors any time his/her 
image is viewed and there is a pending criminal prosecution.  A victim is 
notified that a possessor of their child pornography image has been identified 
and charged with a criminal offense.  The victim is in a better position to seek 
full restitution through future apportioned contributions by other as-yet-
unidentified defenders in subsequent trials before other courts than is the 
                                                                                                                 
 148. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may 
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof.”).  
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defendant in this particular case because they know which image was 
distributed.  Moreover, the defendant is not the typical civil defendant with a 
significant cushion to handle severe financial loss and ability to seek 
contribution from known co-defendants.  These recommendations, which 
center on fault apportionment, would also preclude victims’ attorneys from 
cherry picking wealthy defendants in an effort to seek full restitution from 
defendants who are least culpable but have the deepest pockets.  If a defendant 
of a child pornography possession case has no money, and yet the defendant is 
held liable for full restitution to a victim, it seems that both the defendant and 
the victim lose.  The victim will receive little or no money from a defendant 
who faces years in prison and has only a depleted bank account as his sole 
asset; the defendant, in turn, will have a blighted future when released from 
incarceration with an unimaginable financial obligation.  It is more fair and 
equitable for both parties to have full restitution determined by the court 
during the first criminal trial, and the defendant ordered to pay only his 
apportioned amount of the “total loss” suffered by the victim.  The victim can 
then seek future contributions towards full restitution from other defendants as 
future offenders are identified and held accountable for their crimes. 
IV. Conclusion 
Congress has provided little insight into how the court should determine 
restitution under § 2259.  Section 2259 ambiguously defines the term “full 
amount of the victim’s losses” and refers the reader to the MVRA’s § 3664’s 
sparse procedures to be used for the issuance and enforcement of the order of 
restitution; neither section provides guidance on how precisely to determine 
the amount subject to restitution.  Section 2259 should be amended to provide 
more guidance to judges in how to determine restitution amounts and how to 
fairly apportion fault in the child pornography context. 
These amendments should provide some flexibility and discretion for 
judges to deviate from said guidelines when creating restitution orders; but a 
suitable standard must be established.  Restitution orders should, at times, be 
permissibly decreased based on due process rights under the Eighth 
Amendment; otherwise, restitution orders may appear to be additional forms 
of punishment rather than attempts to make the victim “whole.”  The 
defendant should have the right to a restitution hearing and the right to 
question the evidence presented and cross-examine the expert witnesses at the 
hearing.  The defendant’s ability or inability to pay should be taken into 
account when apportioning fault (as the court does in bank robbery cases). 
Lawyers involved in the restitution process should be educated on the 
relationship between restitution and tort law.  While the defendant cannot 
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negate the prima facie evidence of multiple child pornography images found 
on his/her computer, defense counsel can, at least, attempt to limit the 
defendant’s amount of financial exposure at sentencing if made aware of 
restitution claims in advance.  Defense attorneys should have the ability to 
question the financial damages proffered or claimed by the victim’s lawyer.  
Restitution amounts should be subject to discovery prior to sentencing. 
A defendant’s liability should be apportioned at the restitution hearing, 
and the defendant should only be responsible to pay the victim his portion 
of liability.  The victim is in the best position to seek contribution from 
other co-defendants and to include those who may be prosecuted in the 
future.  If this does not occur, excessive restitution amounts will make it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for possessors to compensate the 
victim.  The current law, as it stands, encourages attorneys to seek out 
victims in order to find deep-pocket defendants who are then forced to pay 
all the damages when their true liability is nominal.  If victims are allowed 
to present their case for damages only once, with the understanding that the 
prevailing judge will determine the full restitution amount and the 
apportionment of liability for all defendants, then this binding decision 
would preclude plaintiffs and their attorneys from taking a second, third, 
and fourth bite of the apple in other federal jurisdictions.   
As the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the Department of 
Justice has stated,  
Producing child abuse images has now become easy and 
inexpensive.  The Internet allows images and digitized movies to 
be reproduced and disseminated to tens of thousands of 
individuals at the click of a button. . . .  The technological ease, 
lack of expense, and anonymity in obtaining and distributing 
child pornography has resulted in an explosion in the 
availability, accessibility, and volume of child pornography.149   
Congress may have gone a bit overboard in attempting to deter child 
pornography with the creation of the § 2259 restitution statute.  A 
“reasonable determination”150 of restitution must be made—one that keeps 
both the victim and the defendant in mind. 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Child Pornography, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/child 
porn.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
 150. United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 294 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that the court 
must make a “reasonable determination” of restitution not merely a “rough approximation”). 
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